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case of the Republic of Korea.
The bulk of the literature on trade and devel
opment attributes
the success of Republic of Korea's! indus
trialization to the
adoption, in the early 1960s, of a neutral, ha
nds-off, outward-
looking policy regime.” Drawing on the neoclas
sical paradigm,
the essence of the argumentis that the i
ntroduction of a low and
uniform rate of protection, offset by equ
ally low and uniform
export subsidises, would haveled the econo
mybackto its shadow
prices, guaranteeing allocative efficien
cy in line with the
country’s static comparative advantages.
The speed, efficiency
and international competitiveness of the
industrialisation that
followed, would have been not mor
e than an inexorable and
theoretically predictable conseque
nce.
Following the lead given by authors
such as Westphal (1982,
1990), Pack and Westphal (1986), Ams
den (1989) and Lall (1991),
the purpose of this paper is to que
stion this interpretation
through a careful investigation of the
role of government in
Korea’s industrialization. It attempt
s to show, first, that even
though outward-orientation was an
important and necessary
part of Korea's success, its polic
y regime was not firm, industry o
r
market neutral, and overall protec
tion was everything but low.
Second, that high protection and
non-uniform incentives were
part of a set of measures designe
d to overcome specific market
failures in the product and factor markets, whic
h, constrained by
the outward-orientation discipline, effective
ly paved the way to
an internationally competitive
industry.
The paper is organised in four sections
. The first sets a proper
background for the discussion, reviewing t
he main charac-




M Sce, for instance, Frank et al. (1975), Krueger
(1979, 1985), Hong (1979),
(1984,1987), (1980), Kim and Westphal (1982),
Balassa (1985, 1991), World Bank
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regime. The following sections cover the government's policies
during what is widely recognised as the three main stages of
Korea's industrialization: the ‘neutral’ export-oriented regime of
the 1960s, the heavy and chemical industry (HCI) drive of the
1970s, andtheliberalisation of 1980s.
I-The Background: thepre-1960 period.
The first significant spurt of manufacturing investment in
Korea took place early this century under Japanesecolonial rule
(1910-1945). Until then, centuries of isolationism under the Yi
dynasty (1392-1910)—onlyinterrupted by the opening of the ports
in 1876—coupled with a feudal economy, had contributed very
little to industrial development. When the Japanese took over,
manufacturing accounted for only 3.3% of GDP.3 Boosted, then,by political and institutional reforms that removed the lasttraces of the ancien régime, and supported by Japaneseinvestments and skills, manufacturing growth eventually tookoff. It reached an annual compoundrate of 10% over 1910-40,with the manufacturing share of GDP increasing to 21.9% in
1940.4 Initially based on light industries, this manufacturingboom soon shifted to the heavy industry (mainly chemicals)following Korea's involvement in Japan's war preparations. Asof 1940, heavy industry accounted for 50% of manufacturingoutput.
However, as Jones and Sakong (1980:23) pointed out, thecontribution of these impressive developments to Korea’s post-war industrialization was severely curtailed by three main fac-tors. First, as Korea's industry was strictly built to complementthe Japanese industrial structure, there were few backward and
Se
3 The figures related to the pre-1950taken from Jones and Sakong (1980, chap 2.
All growth rates of this study, unless stated otherwise, we. » Wereconstant prices using the least-squares method, with the regressioncaned intaking the form log X_ = a+bt +€t , which is the equivalen ttneont to the lo farithmitransformation of the compound growth rate equation X(=Xg(1+r)t where Xi “a °relevantvariable,r is the rate of growth, and
t
is time (World Bank | Sane991:273).
pestod. unless stated otherwise were
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ly dependent on thees, and sales were highly
Saneneweaie As of 1940, two-thir
ds of the analtee
output was exported to Japan. Needless
to say that the Jap:
withdrawal led to a severe market disruption.
Second, virtually all large manufacturing firms anemy
Japanese ‘las of 1941, they made up 91% of the ot tiemane
capital), who also held the overwhelming majority tly hindered
agerial and skilled jobs (81% in 1943). This fact greatly, qualified
the human capital build-up, andled to an eS40% of the work
workersafter the Japanese withdrawal. By 19 ond education
force had no schooling and only 7.4% had seco Suny left the
(Table A.1). And third, the 1947 division ofthe country,ferie
South (which became Republic of Korea) withou lectric power
heavy industry and without 90% the country anduetry's share
supply.® Table A.2 showsthat in 1953, the Pia of the pre-warof manufacturing output wasless than half 0
period.
nder Japaneserule, Korea's
tfacing a severe marke
r had thet mostof its heavy
Therefore, despite rapid progress u
industry in the wake of WWI was
disruption, an acute skill shortage a’ S
Enaealan ne Dur.
industries andelectric power supply. In 1
poe aeane, tre
put was only 14% of the 1938 level.To
add ioheee
outbreak end| ade




Menulechirinewhee of GDP had been redu
ced ve s I:
ebodeheedion Coe
aeaing ‘that Korea shouldram—we
nM
coheanfeatsoa Peioiting her (far from abun
dant) agricultu
“ 6
and mineral resources (Krueger, 1979:77).
Se t followedlitical polarisation tha
wr ig country, division resulted(otttthetell and the U.S. a
right, the
conflict haiorody, ith the country being divided
along
Parallel. J
In 1950, North Korea invaded its so
intervention. ‘The war ended with an arm toeee
For a detailed analysis of the political and econ s
Cole and Lyman (1971).
he U.S.ounterpart provoking
mee 1953, Mathout a clear
winner.
P {tuation in the
1950s, see
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The chaotic state of the manufacturing sector was not, how-
ever, Korea's only problem in the early 1950s. In fact, she emerged
from the Korean War unable to stand on herfeet. Exports, mainly
minerals (tungsten), were just a fraction of imports, which were
mostly financed by foreign aid.7 The financing of this huge
foreign exchange gap soon became the main objective of the
government's policies, which sought concurrently to maximise
foreign aid, carry out IS and boost exports, in this order of impor-
tance.
The IS strategy owed nothing to its Latin American counter-
parts. A complex multiple exchange rate system was introduced,
used concurrently with high and escalating tariffs and
comprehensive NTBs.® Unlike typical IS regimes, though, exports
benefited from a range of export incentives, including
preferential finance, and import licensing conditional on export
performance (1957).2 The results in terms of manufacturing
growth were far from disastrous. Output grew at an annual
average rate of 14.7% over 1954-59 (table A.3), driven by a ‘pre-
emptive’ IS in the light industry.!© Yet, this figure looks less
 
7 As of 1954, 74% ofthe imports were financed by aid (Krueger 1979:67).
During the 1950s, apart from theofficial rate, importers had to deal with at
least three exchange rates according to the foreign exchange source,i.e., exports,
governmentheld foreign exchangeorforeign aid. As of 1957, the weighted average
tariff rate was around 35.4% (table A.10), with the tariff structure ranging fromzero (producer goods) to more than 100% (consumer goods). During 1949-53imports were controlled by a quota system, replaced in 1953 b :
oO y a more flexibscheme, based on a positive list mports. Imports were divided into ndcategories: automatic approved andrestricted. See Jones and Sakong (1980Frank et al. (1975). 6 (1980) and
° The major export incentives introduced up to 1959 were: export-
scheme whereby exporters were allowed to import popular items normal]
anned, commodity tax exemption, export financing, export insurance, tradelicensing based on export performance, export bonuswith preferential exchan erates, paymentofdirect export subsidies, discount on railroad freight rates tatir
exemption on imports of inputs. See table A.11. ,
As Suh (1975) pointed out, the full extent of IS in the light indu
showin the import coefficients (table A.3) given that the tmeorins comeesnot
domestic supply was already very low in 1953, reflecting| e foreig
oO
import link
shortage. In conjunction with stringent import controls, though, IS redenee
consumergoods share oftotal imports from 70 to 25% over 1953-60 (Krueger,
1979).
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impressive if one takes into account the reduced size of the
post-
war manufacturing base.
e results regarding overall economic and export
growthwere+hy disappointing Given the
industry smn
share of GNP, its expansion failed to boost
the o 0 the
economy, resulting in a lacklustre GNP growt
h os?P23;over
1953-59. By 1960, Korea’s GNP per capita was
only ,
half of the LDCs’ average.!! As for exports, the figures w
ere even
more discouraging, doing nothing to alleviate
the dire balance°
payments (BP) problems.!2 Total exports shrank
in averageby
ctured exports by 2.7%.
ce vated im4960toe meagre 13.5% of tota
l exports (table A.6)
ondfor less than 1% ofthetotal manufacturin
g output(table A.4).
expect, Neoclassicals blame the IS policies for
these onewoundte’particularly for the ne
gligible manufactured
exports. !4 The indiscriminate use of NTBs and
hightariffswould
have distorted relative prices, provoking
a dep? ng| s lo
cation of resources; while their combina
tion wi rn pleand
d exchange rates, would have biased i
ncentives to
tnedomestic market, pulling resourc
es away from, exports.
Furthermore, the attempt to ‘buck the markets
’ with a plethora o
regulations, viewed as intrinsic to IS regimes, would have sti
mu-
lated rent-seeking at the expense of more productive activities.
ts, the emphasisthere is truth in these arguments
“wrO oyentives seems to be unwarranted. To
begin with,
orotection eems to have favoured labour-intensive
sectors,
Pinch were very much in line with Korea’s
resource
endowment.!5 This is confirmed by the evolution of
the
, tle et al., 1970:33)11 epBa. The LDCs’ average (GDP) was $150in 1960 (Lit ,
IAs of 1959, 73% of imports werestill financed by aid (Krueger, 1979:67).
See
for BP data.
Tethrates were calculated in current dollars. Total exports from EPBa and
manufactured exports from Suh (1975:84ff).
14 See, e.g., Krueger (1979).
15 See Frank et al. (1975: 36 ff.)
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industrial structure over the period (table A.2). He
nce, there is
ittle room to argue that resource allocation, fro
m a static
viewpoint, was disastrous.
Second, the extent of incentive bias against expor
ts also seems
to have been overestimated. Table A.7 reveal
s that unlike typical -
IS regimes such as Brazil's (table B.17),
the purchase-power-
parity (PPP) exchange rate for exports was
well above that of
imports during the whole period.
In addition, it was devalued by
45.5% over 1955-59. To be sure,it is true
, as Krueger (1979)
pointed out, that PPP exchange
rates do not properly reflect the
NTBs’ impact on import premia
. Yet, the same problem oc
curs
with these indicators in other
IS regimes, and they all tend
to
favour imports rather than ex
ports. Moreover, whatever th
e rela-
tive level of the export and
import exchange rates, one
cannot
dismiss the former's rapid
devaluation as irrelevant.
So,if incentives were
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Without it, the manufactured
export boom of the 1960s, wh
en
prices were allegedly ‘got r
ight’, would have been an
impossibility. !®
Turning now to the overall orien
tation of the government's
policy, it seems to have been
moreof a hindrance than a h
elp to
industrial development. True
, as just noted, IS policies
were
instrumental in rebuilding t
he industry, and had caused
fewer
price distortions than Neocla
ssicals want us to believe.
Moreover,
concerted action in the are
a of education helped to mi
tigate the
industry's skill shortage (ta
ble A.1). Yet, these benefits
appear to
have come more by accid
ent than by design, in a
government
whose actions were do
minated by,




dards, both of which were to
be
achieved by aid maximisat





nt that the policies for
industry were
not more than a by-prod
uct of stopgap measures t
o finance the
BP. Apart from educa
tion, protection was
not accompanied by
other measures geared to
remedy or take advantag
e of market
failures in the product (e.g
. economies of scale and ex
port-related
information and transacti





wasgiven according to a cl
ear timetable, or made condi
tional on
some sort of perform
ance indicator.
In addition, and perhap
s even more damaging,
the
government's overdevelope
d instinct for political surviva
l, led to
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widespread rent-seeking. Evidence that became available after
the fall of the Rhee government (1947-1960)!8, suggest that the
principal origins of ‘illicit wealth’ were: a) non-competitive
allocation of import quotas and import licenses; b) bargain price
acquisition of former Japanese properties; c) the selective
allocation of aid funds and materials; d) privileged access to
cheap bank loans; e) non-competitive award of government and
U.S. military contracts for reconstruction services.
Apart from the first, none of these activities can be said to
haveoriginated from IS policies, deemed by Neoclassicals as the
main source of rent-seeking. Even in the case of NTBs, a com-
petitive system for the allocation of quotas and licences could
have avoided rent-seeking. As discussed later, the successful ex-
perience of the 1960s, where NTBs continued to be extensively
used, tends to support this view. The problem of profiteering,
then, was not so much in the type of police pursued by the -
ment, but in its objectives. P y govern
In short, Korea's industrialization took off early
under Japanesecolonial rule. Despite considerabl
the industry was in a very bad shape after WWII. The shortcom.
ings of a ‘colonial industrialization’ becameall too obvious when
after the Japanese withdrawal, Koreans wereleft without the
necessary skills to run the industry, with a poorly integrated in
dustrial structure and without its main market. The North-South
split made things worse, with the loss of most of heavy indust
and power supply to the North. As it was not enough, the K 2war destroyed half of the rem 6h, the Korea
this century
e development,
Struction of the (light)
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difficulties of learning and recons
truction, and with a gov-
mm
tee its political
nt more interested in intervening
to guaran








its position by the end of the
1950s unsustainable. Intern a
nd
external pressure led eventually
to a new civilian governal in
April 1960, quickly followed
by a military coup dé 7 n19
8 9
This political upheaval woul
d have profound mp cat 1
sor
Korea's industrialization. The m
ilitary's commitmeno g path
and economic independencé ma
ce Oreswere °in. po
ce
regime inevitable. None of the
se ot ereie both the
the previousIS ‘strategy’, given
the S
Sel PYket and forei
gn exchange gap.20 An o
utward-
oriented policy regime turned
out be the answer.
han double to
ults were stunning. GNP growth
more t
9 OGpa,over 1960-72, boosted
by a 20.1% annual growthotthe
manufacturing output (table
A.3). The latter, in turn, wa
led y
exports that grew at an astonishing
rate of 59.9% p.a.. inn asing
its share of manufactene ear
rns.weAe). teen
from 13.5 to 83.0%
. .6). gh
thereSoooperceptible movement
towards the pea re
both in terms of output and exports—the
key fore eind. his
performance was the light
industry, which by ce
ofee
period still accounted for 76%
of manufactured exports an
of manufacturing output(table A.2).
k to attribute these
As noted earlier, Neoclassica
ls were quic
remarkable results to the allegedly neutral
and hands-off aspects
of the new regime. This view, however,
is both simplistic an
 
19 See Amsden (1989, chap. 2) an
d Cole and Lyman (1971) for detail
s.
hile India’s and
Korea’ t for manufactures
in 1960 was $1 billion w
Brazil's were$23billion and $14 billion, respectively
(Kuznets 1977:155). The
current account deficit in 1960 amounted
to 9.3% of GNP (EPBa}.
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misleading. First, it does not take into account that the newregime benefited from the manufacturing and human capital basebuilt over the 1950s. And second, it overlooks the fact thatgovernment intervention under the new regime, rather thanbeing neutral or non-existent, involved concerted action toremedy failures in the workings of product and factor markets.As the former argument was already outlined in the last section,the focus will now beonthelatter, which seems crucial to explain
not only the rapid and efficient industrialization of thbut also of the following decades. € 1960s,
We begin with the product markets
Sake of clarity, was divided into
Intervention in the product markets.
The trade regime
» whenregime would have been somewhat“compromised.tyac
expansiona eapances Provoked by an ill-advised
stable structureofDacentipe ects, 2 BP. crisis precluded a moretempor na of incentives, with the government resorting top ary and extreme measures to curb imports and boost
 eee
21 There ts somethin of a distransitional period. Kim {1975} and“Reem (1985)treatTHetates of thetransitional period, whereas for Frank etal. (1975) it would be 1 961 -63 as the
Krueger(1979), 1960-65. -1866 and for
12
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e the instability, the government’s strategic option
foran sctyard-oriented development was already clear—export
growth was heralded as the only wayto ‘national salvationan
the key instruments of the new regime were putin place. ar Ss, a
comprehensive import-control and incentive system that Oe
export and‘strategic’ industries protection, access to P
ro ucer
goods at international prices, and a variety of financial
an
fiscal incentives.
‘transitional’ years, the import side of the regime
relied On‘controls inherited from the IS period. Th
at is,imports
continued to be subjected to licensing based on
a pos ive list
that had three categories: automatic approval (AA), restr
ic and
prohibited.22 The tariff structure and its rates also
remaie
initially unchanged. The exchange rate, though,
was unified
through devaluations. These controls, howeere
were soon
adjusted given the aforementioned BP problems tha me
rge
1963. The numberofAA items was, then, gradually
reduce able
A.9), tariffs were raised (table A.1oO.aotquotaanda
measures
luding an over
export-mpor link, Whery, oly eeeraere led toa ly




ort side, pre-existent incentives were reinforced
an
complemented by new ones Exonshataadbene, from tariff-free access t ,
finance,and from the export-import link premium,
were granted
further fiscal incentives (exemption from business tax,
an |50%
reduction on incometax), lower preferential interest ra es,
| rect
cash subsidies (1961-1964), and a trade promotion ns
tution
(KOTRA-1962) aimed at reducing export-related informa
 
22 Item not listed in these categories were also subjectto restrictions.
{the 1960s
Fi tof the trade and exchange rate
reforms o
see Franket orassem 4), Luedde-Neurath (1988. chap. 2) and Hong (1979,
chap. 3 and 5).
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and transaction costs.24 In addition, a full-scale annual export
target (1962) was introduced, broken down by commodity, region
and country of destination.25
These measures, reinforced by a maxidevaluation (98%) in
May 1964, eventually improved the BP conditions (table A.8),
which in conjunction with a new, and this time, successful
attempt to unifying the exchange rate (March 1965)26, set the
stage for a trade liberalisation. This liberalisation marked the
beginning of what Neoclassicals believe to have been a fully
fledged neutral, outward-looking regime, with a
structure that wouldlast at leastuntil 1972.
stable incentive
The liberalisation consisted of a re
controls imposed during 1961-64, couple
numberandscale of the
(a) the full-scale export-
laxation of the import
d with an increase in the
import raentives.is to import controls,
was abolished and replaced
by partial ones?7; (b) import quotas were eliminated; (o the
number ofAA items wassignificantly increased, and in 1967, the
positive’ list turned ‘negative’, with import categories remaining
the same, but items not listed were allowed to be freely imported
(table A.9); and (d) the tariff structure was reformed in 1967,
lowering the highest tariff from 250 to 150%. Yet, the weighted
averagetariff increased to from 49.2 to 56.7% (table A.10).
 
24 Modelled on the Japan External Trade Organisation (Jetro), Kotra was
foundedto assist exporters in its relations with foreign buyers. It maintains trade
centres abroad to provide information about the products and services that
Korean exporters and importers buyorsell. It also explores potential markets for
Korean exports and provides training for salesmen (Rhee and Pursell 1984:52).
2 See table A.11. Table A.9 shows that net export subsidies (excluding _tariff
and indirect tax exemptions and export premium) more than double over 1960-64.
26at first, the exchange rate was allowed to float. However, after 6 months,
the governmentintroduced a unitary fixed exchange rate system with ad hoc
adjustments to make up for the domestic inflation. See (Kim, K.,1991:57).
27They included wastage allowance (1965) and end-user-and-related-product
schemes(1966). The former, artificially increased the input-coefficients for
certain inputs and commodities allowing the excess to be used for domestic
roduction or to be sold with considerable profit in the internal market. The
fatter, linked the imports of certain po ular consumer items and inputs to the
export performance of producersof related products (in the case of consumer
goods) and end users {in the case of inputs).
14
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. the emphasis was on increasing
credit, tax
incontivesThe preferential real
rate on export credits turned
clearly negative (table A.13) a
nd the types and xo ume2
preferential loans for export in
creased significantly. inad
,
tion, the government aiming at m
itigating the perverse e€ “ oO
duty-free inputs on intermediate
goods producers, gave om
access to export incentives throughl
ocal letters of credit. AS or
tax incentives, accelerated deprecia
tion was granted to expo ers
in 1966 andin the early 1970s, two
duty-free export zones were se
up.30
description of the reforms might
have already
raised doubts in the reader's m
ind about the possibilityof
describing the resulting trade re
gime as neutral or liber -et
before reaching any conclusion
, one needs to exam ne ie




tes of protection es
.
Westphal’s (1982)vThe latter are s
hown in table 1aneitseem
clear that the figures for manufacturi
ng and ‘all in ustt esback
allegations that the trade regime
had low nominal an eff tive
rates of protection, and was
trade neutral insofar asg ec
ve
subsidies did not significantly favo
ur either exports or domes
sales.3!
 
28 As of 1965, the main types
of export credit available were:
short term
export ereita vi united rediocountsby,Bank ofKoreaterialsandinvestment on export production; crealt eank et al, (1975:49) and Hon
tries. For details see r
ank e
(yeeTobieRanews that e
xports more than trebled their sha
re of tota
domestic credit over the 1963-72 per
iod,
According to this system, expor
te




s that sat clearly
Increasedtee2oeThe performa
nce of the export zones Masan (197and!rt
(1972), despite all the incentive inv
olved, was disappointing,-As0 isos
) they
accounted for only 2.3% oftotal exports (B
NDE, 1988a:46). See
escription of the incentives.
the low level of nominal and effect
ive protection would be further
confirmed by a comparison with other LDCs. For in
stance, as 0 eos
Argentina's nominal and effective prot
ection for manufacturing wasae)
112%, respectively, whereas theeffective subsidy was 110
% (Balassa, :36).
rs could issue letters of credit to lo
cal




Although impressive, this evi
dence is misleading. A more
careful examination of table
1 and its methodology, sugges
ts a
regime that was industry
and trade biased, with any
thing but low
protection. Looking firs
t at the issue of industr
y pias, table 1
uipment, machinery
.




consumer durables and, t
o a certain extent,
II, had high rates of pr
otection not only in co
mparison with other
sectors of the industry
, but also by Neoclassi
cal standards.?2 Th
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Table 1: Korea's Nominal , Ef










Effective Protection® Effective Subsi
dy >
(ISIC) A A
E D A E D
A
Primary Activities 34
16 -16 18 17 -3
22 21
Processed Foods 57
3 -3 -18 -17 2
-25 -23
Bever. and Tobacco |_135




4 -5 -l11 -11
6 -17 -16
Interm. Products I 6 31
2 31 -25 -19
]
43 -30 -22
Interm. Products II 6] 53






9 -2 -1i -9
5 -21 -15
Consumer Durables 78
31 -5 64 51
2 38 31
Machinery 49 28
-13 44 43 5 31
31
Transport Equip. 62
54 -53 163 164 -
23 159 159
Manufacturing 59
11 3 -1 -1
12 -9 -7
All Industries 49
13 0 11 10
9 10 10
c average Between them. 2-19
68 Sales at world
T- D and E stand lor domesti
c ‘and export sales and As t
h
prices as weights. Includes reguia
y and special tariffs. 3- Direct pric
e comparison. Sales at world price
s as
weights. 4- Balassa method. 5- E
ffective subsidy rates are the percen
tage excess of the domestic-produc
er-price
value added, adjusted for credit a
nd direct tax subsidies over the wo
rld-price value added. Value adde
d at   world price as weights. 6- Intermediate products I and Il correspondto intermediate products at lower andhigherlevels of fabrication, respectively. Source: Kim and Westphal (1982:230)
As for trade bias, despite
the neutrality indicated by
the
aggregate figures, most hea
vy industries had effective s
ubsidies
favouring the domestic marke
t, whereas in the rest of the
industry they favoured export
s. Even for manufacturing as
a
whole, effective subsidies were
not well balanced, being biase
d
towards export sales (table 1)
. As Findlay pointed out (Hon
g and
Krause, 1981:31), there
is no theoretical reason,
from a
neoclassical and static point of vie
w, to believe that a trade bias,
either in favour of exports or imports
,Is consistent with the free
trade optimal alloca
tion of resources.
; Moreover, not only incentives w
ere not neutral, but the
midustry’s response was not always in
accordance with then. As




For a significant number of products, including some ofKorea's major textile exports, the import price substantially ex-
average production costs and thus may not represent world pricesat which sustained supplies would be forthcomingto the domesticmarket.
These authors also found out that major export sectors(accounting for 27% of manufactured exports in 1968) had highereffective subsidy and higher than average nominal protection to
Finally, apart from the well-known drawbacconcept,°& the decision to use direct price com
- Consumers€ domestic market did not benefit,
free trad
over or underestima a adeticity of substitution between prima facte te ERPs depending
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tors. Thisface prohibitive tariffs in most sec
ae aebecontirmed by the data available. In 1968, exemptions
forex, ort and selected IS industries accounted for B0% ot rine
totalwhereas commodities with prohibitive tariffs accounteal,
37
70% of domestic sales of domestic production.
rehensive. As ofo no doubt that NTBs were comp
1966.60%of the manufactured OOapieAin of the
ms were subjected to 14).
Seelevel. only imports of raw material and 1000ears
reli tivel freely imported, whereas NTBs were partic sarly
Taportant in the consumer and intermediate goods sectors,
which accounted for only 10 % of AA imports.
iven the shortcomings involved in
eet 0oraesoarisons, the results seem to at penas
tne rat as those derived from legal tariffs would have en.
Birst.{oll ing again Luedde-Neurath (1986), direct pr ce
cst Menns i LDCs tend to underestimate the impact or
croteetion.given the differences in quality ane product
Preeification. This is particularly relevantsoheontoe eat ae
uc
Internati StSovel. onlthoagh acknowledging that without
electivemarket restrictions, these results could only be ascrthed
to‘qualityand product specification differentials. they ass
rere nominal protection for most of these products.
in action during thewas a numberof factors
criedeg overnment’s direct control over Keyintermediate
goods industries, constant monitoring of the p
 
37 iy d Westphal (1982:221). Tariffs were considered prohibitive when




prices, and fierce domestic competition—
precluded local firm’s from taking full pec
import controls (i.e. to fix prices at the international level plustariffs or equivalents), even though they still took full advantageof other non-pecuniary benefits such as the elimination ofcompetition from well-established foreign firms,
39that might have
uniary advantage of
These shortcomings appear to be behind the paradox of lownominal and effective protection despite high selective tariffsand widespread NTBs. The evolution of Korea’s importcomposition (table A.15) gives us a more realistic, ifimpressionistic, measure of the import controls impact. Forinstance, the tine share of consumer goods in 1969 (4.7%) smacksof a structure shaped not by international relative prices, but bystringent government controls.4° It seems no coincidence thatthe import composition accurately re
imports.
Taking all this into account, to e
outward-orientation with th
protection trade regime seems at best unsubstantiatedAccordingly, the same applies to explanations of Korea'smanufacturing and export take-off based on this allegationMoreover, even if the trade regime conformed with the
quate Korea’s move towards€ adoption of a neutral,
» Since exports began to grobefore thefully fledged' ga grow (1960) well
 
The governmentcontrolled th
oll refining. See Nam (1984: 203), Theextore! coal: tron,> € existence of constantP40tiene Proes -mentioned, e.g., by Jung (1989: 13) and Amsden(1 80.in, Share of consumer goods (not including food d toteimports of the U.S., West Ge g ood and beverage) in totalrespectively (UN, various years). ‘Breall and Korea were 15.9, 14.2, 4.2 and 2.9%,






does notction of the Neoclassical hypothesis
constituteTatiself an alternative explanation
of themechanics
trade regime and of its role in the 1960s
boom, give usa
cropping stone. That is, the unmistakably
Se rtyme new




ar dindustry levels. The industry’s market
was segment edints
ex rt and domestic sales. The former's
regime was made Hoes
and1 dustry neutral. The latter's, in turn,
was made ig ly
or t ctionist except for the upstream
industries, w ose
protection was selective (in part an unavoldabie
ipsenad.enti o




ointing to opposing directions, the net e
i aeseeclearly favoured export-oriented
growth.ative
iow r. cannot be perceived by looking
at cross-bor a lay
arteesalone because there were other
powerful forces¢ ca 16
resource allocation (often, as shown by
Kim and| estph Lin
manifest conflict with price signals).
It was Peeaon to good
iled the contradictory incentives and
pu { “ to good
work.Th emerged, first, from the government's
ecis to
make protection, credit (thanks to te a
antarytn:nance
, examined later), and other -
conditional on export performance.*? And second,
from,a
deliberate policy of conglomeration (also t . on
Pratercton
first policy, made exports the main target o e
Heated by
regardless of the cross-border relative prices,
an anie exports
creating conditions for price discrimination,
that without those efforts, such phenomenally rapid export growth could not have
naethe non-pecuniary incentives derived mainly from. theeovebrated‘asdeliberate politicisation of the export activity. Major ed rt Day (November
national heroes and given special awards in the so-calle Expo
30). See Rhee and Pursell (1984: 16).
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profitable even when the internatiaverage costs.43 onal price was below the
Theoverall result was that Korea managed to boost is staticcomparative advantages beyond ‘free-trade’ limits, withoutgiving up thepolicies that would bring dynamic benefits On th. etS atic side, despite the already noted considerable developmentof
performance, not only provi
inputs at world prices. Kore SS to embodied technolo. a, as wil gy andbenefit from this approach in the followingdecade would fully
 
co ae stated in the introduction price dnditions. Fi ’ cé disce markets are gtsineary is imperfectcompediine MPNS 40 pr
government created these pre-ca nae seems to be no doubtthe Secondly that
y stimulating conglomerationthroug: by Eyhee the domeut, the Korean
The cotton textile indus neustry licensing and credit ratiges 2"i trarodustviy was 86% below Japairs by1Thee etet, 190our.B. Kim, 1980:280). © gap had been reduced 48%
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Industrial organisation policies
As noted earlier, there are two other governmentinterventions
in the product market, which, in conjunction with the trade
regime, deeply affected the industrial structure, and played a key
role in Korea's industrial success: the policies for conglomeration
and foreign direct investment (FDI). Beginning with the former,
there is enough evidence to show that the so-called ‘big business’
policy was not something that began with the ‘HCI push’ of the
1970s, as suggested by mostofthe literature, but with the ‘neutral’
regime of the 1960s. The main instrumentsof this policy appear
to have been credit rationing, investment licensing, import and
FDI protection.
The government control over the financial sector (examined
later) seems to have been deliberately used to increase
concentration both at the industry and aggregate level. Hard facts
~ are scarce, but this appears to be the only reasonable explanation
of the extraordinary growth of the so-called jaebols (Korean word
for conglomerates), and of their peculiar financial structure. For
instance, table 2 shows that over 1965-70, the share of small and
medium firms (SMF) in total exports increased but remained
quite marginal, and their shares of manufacturing output and
domestic credit presented a marked decline, particularly the
former. Moreover, in 1972, i.e. even before the start of the ‘HCI
push’ (widely believed to have favoured large firms), the SMFs
had an access-to-borrowing ratio (27%) well below that of the
large firms (46%).4°
Even though these figures already point to a ‘big business’
policy, they underestimate its impact since small subsidiaries of
the jaebols are included among the SMFs. The extent of this
underestimation can be gauged by the fact in 1970 ‘competitive’
markets amounted to only 36% of total shipments (table A. 16).
. Another strong indication of a credit bias towards the jaebols lies
in the manufacturing debt-equity ratios. Over 1965-71, they rose
 
b 45 Cho and Cole (1986:26). Access-to-borrowing ratio is the amountoftotal
ank andforeign loans divided by total assets.
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from 104 to 345%, a level si, gnificantly higher thU.S. but similar to Japan's (table A.25). Unlike the latter,thoughtthe banks in Korea were in th mme *
those of the conglomerates.46 government's hands andnotin
The link between this hijaebols becomes amazingty debt-ratios and the rise of the‘ clea
(1980:273) accountof the conglomerates’‘growtienaeakong's
One privately held company ' '
proval for an industrial projec. Itoatpets governmental ap-
urse once agai
usually put up much equity but will rely he n the firm will not
avily on external debt.
 
Table 2: Share of Small and Medi i i= oatput and Domestic Credit,t96e (my=Stamss0 196519701975 4089 — 1984Mur 23 32.2 34.5 32 4Mn - Output 56.3 27.5 30.6 d 25.4
ater=Ta meee 30.3 27.5 0358 0.5*°1979, Source: Michell(1988:84) tonneMi Fewer Than 2 oe(1987:154) for credit. Both authoroe or reeons and manufactured spat endIFederation and SMB Industry PromotionConorsl and MediumBusiness(SMB)
ports,
  
             
me C ed M » 3. (1991:66), who maintained that OV. 19cr 65-
 
 
For a comparison betw.
(1989). For a com cen Korea'sprehensive aebol and
Sakong (1980), Jones (1987) spalvtsoftheJaceisreatZalbatsu See Hattori
. , a, Jones and
24
 
GovernmentIntervention and Industrialization: Korea
67, despite not being required to be formally licensed,
investments had to be registered at the competent ministry,
risking rejection or delay for various reasons.4? Formally or not,
though,the truth of the matter is that during the ‘neutral’ peri
od,
the government had enough powerto ‘kill’ any businessinitiat
ive
by denying, for instance, access to credit, imports or techn
ology
licenses (see later). The rapid increase in concentration
suggests
that this power was probably used.
In addition, any policy towards increasing concentration and
forming local conglomerates would not have been effective
without a protected domestic market and
a
restrictive FDI policy.
The existence of the former was already discussed in the previous
section, while the latter is going to be taken up next.First, t
hough,
we have to consider the benefits that a deliberate congl
omeration
policy has brought.
The advantages of size and conglomeration are controversial,
and the literature on industrial organisation emphasises t
he
deleterious effects of monopolistic market stru
ctures on
production, income and efficiency. Most of this dis
cussion,
though, assumes well functioning factor markets,
constant
returns, closed economy and is done within a static c
ontext. In
the dynamic and imperfect world of 1960s Korea,it is of lim
ited
use.In fact, the rise of thejaebol seems to have brought quite a f
ew
benefits, even allowing for the fact the light industry's s
cale
economies at the plant level were limited (the most obvio
us
benefit of size).
To begin with, given the scarcity of skilled labour and the
amount of time involved in developing it, conglomerati
on
allowed Korea to use more effectively its limited resources and
therefore enter rapidly into a large number of industries. As
Scherer and Ross (1990:122) pointed out, large diversified firms
 
47 Jung (1989:12), was cqually brief, but more explicit stating that "the Korean
governmentis heavily involved in the determination of the firms that can enter
certain sectors of the economy. In many industries, private firms have to get
approval from the governmentto start a new business."
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can ‘economise’ on skilled services by having a commoncentralpool of managers and technicians whose skills are not productspecific.48
Second, with respectto exports, conglomeration not only led tothe economies of scope in m
mentioned above (see Keesing and Lall, 1988), but also to scale
acterises these activities and theimporting of the necessary inputs.
Third, conglomeration gave local fidevelop internal capital markets
Fourth, as noted earlier, the formation of monopolisticmarkets at home coupled with import protection, opened the wayto price-discrimination, which, in turn, allowed firms to offercompetitive prices abroad at the early stages of the learningcurve.
Finally, the formation of loca] conglomerates made thetransition to the heavy industry (see n
S at plant andfirm level (e.g.To face the long-term maturationtypical of investmentsin this industry; and theref;off the imperfect competition rf d foreto, fend
of well-estab]which had the first-mover a ablished foreign firms,dvantages of ‘ o0od-wil]’1974) and static and dynamic economies of scale will’ (Corden,
 
on finance feasibi]recruitment, technology contracts civil constr ety studies, training andrc onstruction, e
Jasieat kaeensroe Ofne but a few, For a detailed semen! onhowthe
e Ook dvantages of th se economies f scope sce en (198onett) e
»
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listic structures mentioned aboveThe drawbacks of monopo s abo
n checked by the gove
appearstonavelines. i.e. credit and protection, whose
tnitenance was made conditional on export performance.
foreignFDI policy, Korea managed to keep
isatDe roehough the letter of the law was indicating
the
contrary “At first sight the 1965-72 foreign capital legisla ion
looksat liberal.42 Based on the 1960 Foreign Capit 1
Toei ant Law (FCIL), it granted lavish tax incentives
or
technology licensing and FDI.59 Until 1965, there wassome
teeuiotlons on foreign ownership (at least 25% of the cap
nad
teownedb local investors) and profit repatriation (maxi
m
30%ofthe Pavested capital), but theywerecompete
yrea. in
Vi
noted In1970andieexportzones where FDI incentives
where,
even more generous.
hen FDIssion, however, tends to fade away w
ae torenedol Table A.17 showsthat loans were
the pane
foreign capital flows during 1966-72, and that in terms
oer
Koreeware t the bottom of East Asian league by any rereeel
Thecompar on with Latin American NICs is
even mor s ing.




hile Brazil's 33.8% and Mexico's 21.4%.
, inal share offlect the foreign firms’ marg
seeadeouteat.In 1971, they accounted for
only 6.2%oftotal
exports and even though data for output is on yaval
ble for
1974 (15.4 %), that year's figure can be taken as e
 
5) and Koo (1982, 1985).
“9 See, for instance, Frank etal. (197 ted on income accruing' m income tax was granted o
Full or partialexemptionservices. and FDIs enjoyed a fullexempttonfromfrom the provision 0 tion income tax for the first three years, a tice om Imported
toeYorth TF ext|five years, a full exemption from Sati dulics
capital goodsand no capilal oon wt sing val be examined in the sectionThe policy on technolo ce
concerning‘intervention in the factor markets.





the FDIs had been ma: oriA.19) jority or wholly owned by foreigners (table
Table 3: Share of Forei i ign Firms in Exports .
SHES OF Output in Korea 1971-86 (%) Manufacturing
Exports 2a a an 1978 _*1984 19086
° . 6
aoSes 15.4* 17.0 03. is 18.3
(1982:200) for 1978 and’Bark(1989.23)ton 18a86" “ am or - n ‘00 20.2  
Moreover, evidence on FD
the restrictions were sector cioral allocation suggests thatSpecific. As Koo (1985: 184) putit,
ThiS appears to square with the fact that FDI tended€d to beconcentrated either on the intepetrochemical) or on the leadingoes sector (fertilisers
The assess
manufacturinga or the impact this restricti
straightforward, andlke theeeuecoewormance
Wve policy on
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benefits, it is bound to be controversial.54 Yet, one cannot hel
p
noticing that the FDI policy was remarkably consistent
with the
government’s intervention in the other areas of the product an
d
factor markets. It avoided the Latin American incongruit
y of
offering local infant firms import protection, while at the sa
me
time inviting world class producersin, with its damaging
effects
on the former's growth and technological capabilities.
This, in
turn, had at least two important consequences. It he
lped to steer
the country away from a truncated_process of techno
logical
development, which, as with TNC affiliates in LDCs, wa
s not
likely to go beyond the adaptive and duplicative st
ages (Lall,
1992): and, as notedearlier,it opened the wayfor the develop
ment
of local conglomerates, whose benefits were already
discussed
above.
Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that the T
NCs'
limited share of Korea's market and exports, also made re
source
allocation more responsive to the government's complex sy
stem
of incentives, since local firms were not subjected to a glo
bal
strategy devised elsewhere, and had their main sourc
e of capital
controlled by the government.
Intervention in the factor markets.
The financial market.
To claim that Korea’s manufacturing and export su
ccess
during the 1960s wasthe result of ‘neutral’ incentives
in the
product markets, one has to implicitly assume that financ
ial
markets were complete, competitive and ‘undistorted’ by
government intervention. That is not, however, what the
evidence suggest. Not only the capital market was virtually non-
existent in the early 1960s°°, but also the government did not
roetate to intervene to overcome this and other related market
ures.
 
4 For recent surveysoftheliterature, sec Weiss (1988) and Helleiner (1989).
In 1963, the stock market value as a percentage of GNP was a meagre 2%




countries are bound to
imperfections. In LDCs, th
severely aggravated
), financial markets even in developed
be imperfect due to informational
ough, these imperfections tend to be
Because the process of change itsinformational problems; but more importantly, the institutionalframework for dealing with these capital imperfections areprobablyless effective because of the small scale of the firms andbecause the institutions for collecting, evaluating anddisseminating information are less likely to be developed. (ibid.,p.200)
elf leads to greater
This greater uncertainty leads,first, to a strong bias towardsshort-term assets, and consequent]y to a shortage of long-termfinancing. And second, to a market interest rate that tends toremain above the opportunity cost or its Socially optimum level.
With inadequate and expensive finance, firmsinternal earnings for
Competitiveness, but alsoincreases their risk in an already risky environment. Needless tosay that in this scenario expected private returns tend to stabelow the social desirable, particularly for investments andriskier anywhere in the world, but that ared non-pecuniary rewards,
chnology intensive
t say that the Korean government wasems, its actions were vOvercoming them, however second or third-best theyvetIntervention in the financial markets began in 196] with thenationalisation of commercia] ba on the grounds that thewere ‘illegally hoarded Property’.55 This movevirtually gave the
 
commercial and
banks like the Korea
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le 4 showsthatifntrol of loanable funds. Tabl
BOdebank to foreign loans (the ratter’s eeethe
one uaranernmental repayment g
Tonaeaent’sVeecolamounted, in average, to 92% of the totalg ve
credit.°7
 
   
Table 4: Flow of loans in Korea: 1965-72 (%) ——
OK Bank Gov't Foreign Curb total Total go i
™ bans loans! loans loans
_
loans controlled
0 15 17 100
196° é 44 0 48 2 100 aS
oer 1 57 0 34 8 100 9
2
eg 2 51 0 35 12 100 Be
136° 60 0 32 7 100 33
O0 d 52 2 32 15 100 86
Oy 0 64 1 27 8 100 ry
1972 0 82 0 21 -3 100 ——
_**
The curb market co ci nce andtrust loans. * All less curb marketloans. HEea nt subj
ect to
cetrencredot ousideieeatenofelite Sian aan,not sbioO
Hone (1979:164).
dustrial credit), non -ank in 1954 to supply long term in a
Deveegfin . cial ‘netitutions (NBFI) and Beeb meekets.“he 1967,
tnstitutionsthat remained in Pohare nr“aldeposits‘and loans until 1980 weres whose shares of to
and some of tnehad any importance. Seeibid. for details. looment Banktoo BByetit all the guarantees were issuedby|eyGopeovedby” ne National
, o be Io
and bytheBankofKorea,are commercial banks began to issue repaymentAssembly. ‘
aran 1 byt roval) without the need for approva
N tees(acornfeHong(1979143). Foreign firms were not allowed
toe Na .
. officially borrow money abroad (Park, 1985:290).
e government control insofar as they
- Thess figures ttorovendNDEI feat were private owned.Theirshare
racludelocal andforetenhe period, though, seem to have been insi nificant,“Tire
focalbam Pan pianae of 3.6% of the bank deposits during i$ Lidgeianenerlocal b nks for the foreign banks was 0.6%. As to NBFI, thevocme Od Park,




Despite the advice of eopl
thefeelike Gurley, Patrickand‘Shawsspetted neoclassical
finan sector was
of market-led interest r tog Combined with the textbook solution
dox ahand. a misguided Pproach was adopted. One thr egative real inter
1965ad largely prevailed (with the usualdetermi electscn» was dropped.>9 On the other hand. a
 
 
Gurley, J., Shaw, EB. and Patrick, HStudy commissioned 6
monetary reform, as ques the U.S tructu» quoted by Cole and p the occasi re of Korea",
The CpegaatBeset-L0-GNP ratio fellfg on of the 1965
ast reaching 2.1% in 1972.(Core
l ‘
. Aid Prego) inancial Ss
and restaurant service consumpti
8 were Virtually ~4oon 800ds, luxu
See Hong (1979: ] Y tuled outas bo Ty 800ds, entertainment
(1986: 167), 63), Cole and Park (1983:175)"viene, 1979:112).
ong and Park
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« This overwhelming anddiscretionary control over credit was
apparently used in the pursuance of four major aims: To boost
manufacturing investment, to promote externality-prone
activities such as exports, to foster dynamic comparative
advantages in selected infant industries, and to promote
conglomerates. With respect to manufacturing investment, in a
bid to increase expected private returns, interest rates were h
eld
well below the opportunity cost (table A.13), and both commercial
and development banks were forced to concentrate th
eir
resources on long term loans.®2 Short-term, working capital
credit was supposed to come from the firm's internal earnings or
from the unofficial curb market. Moreover, commercial banks,
with a few exceptions, were not allowed to provide consumer
credit.65
Exports, as noted earlier, were the government's top priority,
and not only benefited from unlimited short-term credit—coupled
with a series of other preferential loans—but also had negative
real interest rates over the whole period (table A.13).
Neoclassicals like to emphasise that the non-discretionary
nature of the short-term export credit is an evidence of ma
rket-
led resource allocation. This is, however, a mere drop of
neutrality in an ocean of selectivity, since the export share of
domestic credit was never more than 10% (table A.21) and the
short-term, non-discretionary part of it was even more
diminished.&4
The infant heavy industries, which under a deregulated
financial market and free trade regime were not likely to see
much of the banks’ money, also benefited (selectively) from
 
62 Hong (1979:204) estimated that the interest subsidy was around
40% of
Toss fixed capital formation during 1962-66, and about 75% during 1967-71. The
ong-term loans assumed the form of continuosroll-over of short-term loans. See
> Cole and Park (1983: chap. 5) and Amsden and Euh (1990:16)
63 See Hong (1979:116).
The share of the latter in total export loans over 1970-72 was in average
43% (Hong and Park, 1986:165). Long term export loans were far from being
automatic and had be approved notonly by the banksbutalso by the ‘competent
minister’ (Hong, 1979: 124).
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Banas’credit, particularly from the Korea Developmentthat ever the oans. Data on overall credit allocation shows
ugh thelight industry received the most,65 more
com : cation overnatn,ineWonane9Totesowin
gap, as evidence of significant ‘disto Hong itention to the latter(as opposed to a Presumably ‘neutral’ 1960s), m credit allocation
f intra-f.promoting conglomerati a-lirm capital markets, b
banking s on, the government "the€ System to perform therole that capitalmarkets‘played
handsof the schumpeterian entrepronnTearg apttal in theu
manufactorine them of the part of the uk in ‘olyultimately ie nvestment. In other words the banks( id
with the advantagethatie Played the part of the shareholacne
As noted earlier, 2ysman (logsr” not seeking short-term profits
a ‘credit-based financial ) called this type of arrangement,systeopposedto theliberal capital-marketbaseommstered prices’ as
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Chart 1: HCI's Share of Incremental Credit Allocation,
Manufacturing Output and Value-added:1966-89
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Note: 1- HCI% inc. loans is the heavy and chemical industry’ share of
the credit increase of the
commercial and development banks. From 1984,it includes NBFI and Special banks’ loans.
2-Share of manufacturing outputis in currentprices and shareof value-addedis in 198
5 prices.
Source : BOK(a), EPB (a) and Suh (1975:85)
Human capital and S&T policies
Apart from the financial sector, there are two other
government’s moves in the factor markets that are
also
overlooked by the ‘neutral incentives’ explanation, and cannot be
left outside any attempt to understand Korea's success in the
period and beyond. Thefirst concerns the strong commitmentto
education, Even though this is generally accepted as an area
where, given the externalities involved, government intervention
is needed (so-called functional interventions), little attention is
usually given to its role in supporting industrialization. A well-
educated work-force is not a sufficient condition for a successful
industrialization, but as Lall (1991b:28,vol.II) put it “it provides




attainments in 1960 van
1970s the contrast betweenKyeover quality,68 by the early
Second, becausethe s’ ocial costof acquiring technological capability the two other major formslicensing, tend to be heavily underestin FDI and technology
Advantages such a ated b m
overshadow short andlowes risk and y market prices,
alia, from the afore g
 67 Harbison, F. H
Development. Princeto et al. (1970) Quantitatin
n University. Pr e Analyses o
;
vocations)inetal. (1980:36 ff), A nceton.
As quoted ap Modern
emphasis on sclenceandmeee against the
See Lall (1991b(1990, Chap. 17)
isationAmsden (1989-9ne
a Ss, of
ology. Sce also Amsdenve, side, and ofthene of2), Pack and Westphal
»
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not everything went as planned, |
GovernmentIntervention and Industrialization: Korea
capabilities, from the rents involved in the infor
mation-
imperfect technology market, and from expo
rt and other
restrictions facing licensees andaffiliates.
Again, as if perfectly aware of these problems, the Kor
ean
government took measures that fostered invest
ment in
technological effort. That is, it restricted FDI and tech
nology
licensing; promoted other less costly and more co
mplementary
forms of technology transfer,e.g. capital goods impo
rts and turn-
key plants; fostered conglomerates capable of meeting t
he R&D
financial requirements, of hedging R&D risk via di
versification
and of benefiting from R&D scale economies; and inv
ested in R&D
and in the S&T infrastructure.
As FDI and conglomeration policies were already dealt with,
let us look at the other measures. In the case of technol
ogy
licensing, after a brief and costly period of laissez-faire,’it was
formally restricted in 1969. The new regulation established th
at
all technology contracts had to be approved by the Economic
Planning Board, had a 3% royalty ceiling and could only last for
a maximum three years. In addition, it banned clauses involving,
e.g., export restrictions or input procurement (Kim and Lee,
1990:88). The impactof this policy can be gauged by a compar
ison
of Korea’s data on technology licensing with those of other NIC
s.
For instance, Westphal et al.'s (1985:190) estimates for 1970
-71,
put Korea's payments for disembodied technology at 0.04%
of
GNP, and Brazil's at 0.20%. On the other hand, thanks
to the
selective protection to the heavy industry, Korea had in the
early
1970s one of the NICs’ highest ratio of capital goods impo
rts to
investment(20%) (ibid., p. 187).
As to investments in S&T and R&D,the first relevant mo
ves
seem to have been made in the second half of the 1960s, w
ith the
establishment of the Korea Institute of Science and Technology
 
70As Luedde-Neurath (1986:57) pointed out, Korea had somenasty exp
eriences
with technology licensing in the early 1960s, notably with cosmetic and
pharmaceuticals. ‘The contracts were aimed essentially at obtaining the foreign
trademark for use in the domestic market, and more importantly involved little
more than simple repackaging of semi-finished products by the Korean partner”.
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(KIST) in 1966, the Ministry for Sciencin 1967 and the Korea Advanced Inst1971. The first institution was aimedresearch, the sec
and the third hadGs theor
e Ta had the task of suppl ing high] alifiedsclentists,7) This institutional build- ID Was aces eaegradual increase of R&D outlays, funded primaril by theemaent {fable ee eecn the light industry's weight during, ulk o 0
were related to problecs aria utlays and institutional support
€ and Technology (MOST)
itute of Science (KAIS) in
at industry related applied
co-ordinate the S&T policy,
economies, and accessto frontier
face the drawbacksof a free
to fully exploit dynamic comparative afailures). How couldit be?
It seems to have been the result of a coaction in the product and factor markets.was set up,virtually segmenting export andThe former was made liberal and industry nsecond, protectionist and selective, Th
Cutral, while theexporters free access to producer good
is arrangement allOweS at world Prices, while
 
a See Leeetal. (1991)for details.
See below. The number of scientists and1960-70 Kim, L. (1989:3), ane engineers increased four folg over
»
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offering the light industries and selected sectors of the heavy
ket where to reap static and
aust aeeates. Thishowever, could not have worked
oyehautinterventions in other areas of the product and factor
warkel which not only reconciled the regime's contradictory
Treentives but also made sure that the local firms’ response wou
be optimised.
to theconglomeration gave local firms access
veantes‘of scope and scale particularly necessary toexploit
dyr ic advantages in the heavy industry, and set the co ons
oneri discrimination, which boosted static advantages. 4
Poly ic was instrumental in at least three ways: in preven ng
TNC‘rom taking advantage of the protection ataneseseicel
local firms; in precluding a trunca
aeelopment: and in assuring a promptprivate sectorwenltt
policy
to incentives. In the factor market, the discretionaryor Policy
was used to: reconcile teeoruringiyincens,ot :eBroduc
; ufacturin
eeereet OatesSind long-term financing; to forge the
aforeme ntioned local conglomerates; and to increase the expect
aswate returns of externality prone activities,ane
a fan
ind tries. Finally, the policies towards human cap 0
er
assur d that the process of acquiring technological
capa e
would t be hampered by a poor stock of human capit
iory
local-firms' under-investment in indigenous technolog
effort.
I-The heavy and chemical industry (HCD drive (1973-79).
The 1973-79 period is usually portrayed in the trade angde
velopmentliterature as the ‘dark ages’ of Korea's pe cy Ment in
The essence of the argumentis that Korea, after seene nelightin
the previous decade, inexplicably abandone e itward
looking hands-off strategy, to build its HCI. The argume tg es
on saying that, fortunately, after having paid a avyP icetn
terms of misallocation of resources and (export) growth,
39
Texto para Discussdo
abandoned, in the early 1980s, this
restored the quasi-free-trade regime irrational’ strategy an
d
73 Despite being dominant,
in the policy regime, its basic stru
appear to have been altered. Secondly, even though there isevidence of misallocation of res
and benefits does not seem to favourtheformar” between cost
The first signs of adjustmthird Five-Year Plan arts.inthe regime came out with the
structure; and second
advantages were changing and that thchanges would not be secured by market forces
In fact, although ex
41.2% p. ports have grown f
enoughto reve 1960-72 against 23.0% forta than imports {at
exports' ve ent the worseningofthe trade
balanes it was not
exporters atceseaN ino! base. The minus idle
que to the
prices, turned out beA end capital goods at internationsyan eearnings per dollar of export,rehennng net foreign exchange
natural resource endo g not onlwment b y Korea's pointermediary goods industry.76 also the size of the capitaland
e third five
HCI share year plan set tw
exports from19Hesa 10 51% over197]BaSets 0 the HCI;
metals, machinery over the same period. Stee] ing the HCI share of» aut perioindustry were listed as keyingot.Shipbuilding and tngemcals, non-ferrous
, 0:4
76 See Jung-ho (1980), Kim, J.H m, J.H.,
1990;4) € electrical-electronicTh import cesoey Kitt JH. (1980) and World Beak (108
from 5.8 to 48.2% over 1964-731)rts (imports for exports d 7:38,vol. 1).
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The shift in comparative advantage was being signalled by a
rapid growth in labour costs (table 5) vis-a-vis the so-called
second tier NICs. A trend that was being compoundedby rising
protectionism in the developed countries towards labour-
intensive goods.’” The export prospects of HCI products, however,
were perceived as being brighter not only because of the changes
in the factor prices but also dueto an allegedly Japanese decision
to move way from pollution-prone and natural-resource
intensive industries (Enos and Park 1988:34).
 
Table 5: Growth Rates in Labour Productivity, Wages and Unit Labour
Costs
in Manufacturing, 1965-1984.
1965-73" 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1982 1984
27.0 |34.7 33.8] 34.3 28.6 22.7 14.717 8.1Wages nominal 21.6 35.3




16.8] 21.7] 17.3] 8.8 -4.6 7.1 5.7
Lab.productivity 13.0 17.0 7.5 7.0 10.9| 12.0| 15.8] 10.6] 7.8 [10.5
Unit labcosts? 7-7 26.0[ 17.9] 26.4| 20.7| 19-8] 10.9] 10.9 6.4 -2.2
Real unit labour! -2.8 1.8 -5.7] 9.1 9.7 4.7 -6.0|-14.0| -0.6 -4.3         costst  
Arithmetic average.“ Nominal minus consumerprice index. 7 Rate of change of nominal
wage index/labour productivity index. 4 Rate of change of the real wage index adjusted by the rte of change of the labour productivityindex. Source: Data for 1965-73 from Amsden (1989:201) and for the rest of the period EPB (a).
As to the political motivation, it would have stemmed from
apprehensions about national security. The Nixon
administration decision to reduce U.S. ground forces stationed in
Korea and the opening of USrelations with China would have
persuadethe governmentto build its own defence industries.78
a more refined measure based on input-outputdata, estimated t
hat the direct and
indirect import content of Korean exports increased from 1
5.8% to 25.5% during
1963-73.
77 in 1973. for instance, Korea introduced ‘voluntary’ export
restraints on
textile exports to the U.S. and in 1974, restrictions were extended worl
d-wide with
the signing of the Multi-Fiber Agreement. See Jung-ho
(1990:20).
The chairman of the Planning Council of the HCI Promotio
n Committee,
in an interview with Jung-ho (1990: 19). stated that
defence needs and economic





These economic and political aims prompted the governmentto adjust the policy regime, increasing protection to the HCIs, andchannelling more resourcesin their direction. The objective ofthe adjustment, however, was not only to develop a HCIs for
A r r
The trade regime.
On the export side, the need to adjust incentives to achieve theHCI aims coincided with an unprecedented boom in exports.Boosted by the high g
international currency realignments (table A.7), Korea's exportsgrew 50% in 1973, convincing the government that incentivescould be streamlined and fiscal resources reallocated to the HCIprogram.?’9 Apart from reducing credit and interest Subsidies, 80export incentives accruing from import rights were reformed toincrease protection for the HCls. Tarif; exemptions for capitalgoods were confined to selected export and import industries,81
 
® The analysis of the mid 1970s ad ustments in trade 1mainly on Hong(1979), Westphal (1979) ard Yoo (1990), Policy was basedFor instance, in 1973, the 50% reduction of coexport earnings was abolished, and 7poration and incoraised by two ints (tab) taesthrates on short-term export creany
two
percen points (table ese credits% of the export valuefrpet approximately 95 9%), werealso limited to 85Exporters though were allowed to pay the tariff in |exemption criteria were as follows: essentially for the manufacturingpee? Theof the technology and availability in the domestic market. Although capital
cont.
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- automatic exemptions for imported inputs were replaced by a
‘drawback’ system, and import-export links were phased out.
es led to a decline in export incentives
leA3) they.should not be interpreted as a policya
taeads "mward-looking strategy. It was more of as a eg
ton at to foster HCIs and eliminate excessive profits, an a
aoein direction. The key elements of an export-orien ed
cnane rere still there. For instance, even though the - c .
Brees te was held constant over 1974-79, the PPP exc ang
Ceeoeeined above its 1968 level, then considered ‘realistic
(table"A7).82 Moreover, new SeonOtsubsrieasureswere
red and cre
introduced675),and Dect-shipment financing for HCI exports,
epreeghthe newly established Korea Export-Import Ba
(1976).88
formed and NTBsrt side, the tariff structure was re
ti htened ‘Theformer was adjusted to increase protesin (orle
HCls andreduce it for the rest of Oeiphtlyoverth© period (table
verage rates decline °
A10)84AstoNIBS they were considerably tightened over 1968
 
theto be exempt from import duties,
sooer amaneeste iohe Oeandamectic content requirementfor large
plant
Acilitiesand for those built with foreign loans. 4 apparently from an attempt
decision to fix the exchange rate resulted ap rently from anattemPi
ral lation and subsidise capital goods imports ,orthe| ce WPI grow tn
st sekin1973led to a period of high inflation. During BOKa
vena e34 5% p.a wellabove the 1965-73 average (8. fat Cdueing Korean
OSS The pron tt of trade companies (TC) was aimed a reduc ngKorean
ie spend ne upon Japanese TCs, lowerin transactHoncostsand
facilitating acess te
;
interhationa credit. Incentives inclu d, immediateaccess.
aerikSannowithoutletters of credit, relaxedcontrolsonae rentoriesof
’ nces
overseasmarketing W inereasede268)The TCs ended up being notmorethen.a
newlabel forthe Nis fand in the early 1980s their incentives we abolished
(PEER,June esa)Th TCs increased their share of exports from12thes over
[o7abaTe 1990, however this share was reduced to roughly
Pursell, 1984:148 and FEER 1990, 1 March).
forms, in 1973, 1977 and-79 there were three majortariff re a
1979. fnthefretvelomnthe special tariff (introduced in 1964 to elimin
cont.
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changeseetthat and consumer goods (table A.1
4). These
consumer good at import controls—until then confined to
production ods and selected HCI goods not used in export
spective of theoy expanded to cover most of the HCI sectors.irre
-
€ market of destination. This seems to be confirmed
by the results of interviewS conducted b
1975-76, reported by Westphal (1979:271): the World Banks during
wl{ appears that competing imports of heavy industrial
rodp ucts have been effectively prohibited in numerouscases, even
wh
productsnehaee importer is engaged in export activity. The
cal engineer! ude basic chemicals and metals as well as mechani-
ducers' associationdee: For the last group, the machinery pro-
subject to arbitr tio determines eligibility for an import license,
items in the restri ‘te by Ministry of Commerce and Industry, for
with domesticall cted list. The criterion used is that equipmentcally produced similar cannot be imported unlessthe termS on which it can be purchased, including price, quality,and deliveitem. Ty date, are not competitive with those for the imported
The last part of W '
that the additionalbro S Teport draws attention to the fact
e light industry in the previous period,
through world prices, but this time not onl
&h export performance but also by price controls.8° Alongwith highby fise& Srdosand lighter NTBs, the HCIs were also favoured
pecuniary incentives, based on sector-specific
reforms, particularly ; Sthed average rates had, y the latter. How Ss to wait for 1977 and 1979
after the HCI pushwas over. everthelrimpactwould only be felt in theIn this respect, thby Enos and P. » the case of the Hankook
over by a Jacbol (0988,chap. 3), is quite illustrative‘ThessCo. analysedpon nies inc impr Smetanai oegavermmontpa y's most im sized diesel e
asked in exchange the right to controlthegovernmentagreed wit the‘enech the
domestic market for the product was being:Suppliedtreet By 1978 the whole00.
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promotion laws, including tax holidays, special depreciation and
purpose-built estates and infrastructure.®©
ERP estimates for 1978, for what they are worth,®” suggest that
all these changes reinforced the selectivity implicit in the 1960-
72 trade regime (table 6). Effective protection rates for HC
industries—transport equipment, durable goods, machinery and
intermediate goods II—perhapsexceptfor the last one, were either
increased or remained relatively high. Furthermore, as in 1968,
incentives in manufacturing continued to be biased towards
exports.





Sector (ISIC) 1968 19782 19789 1982
Agriculture 19 57 77 74,
Mining 4 -1.5 -26 -2
Processed Foods -18 -44 -29 -48
Bever. and Tobacco -19 33 28 15
Construc. Material -11 12 -15 51
Interm. Products I -25 37 -38 62
' Interm. Products II 26 21 8 40
Consumer Nondurab. -11 67 31.5 43
° Consumer Durables 64 243 131 52.5
, Machinery 44 44 47 32
+
|
Transport Equipment 163 327 135 124
Manufacturing -1 32 5 28
All Industries 11 39.7 30.6 n.a   
* Direct price comparison, Balassa method. “ Estimated by Yo
ung, S. (1984) ~ Estimated by
Nam (1984). Note: Fordefinitions of Ind. groups see table 1. .
Source: Kim and Westphal (1982:230) for 1968; Young, S. (1984) “Trade Policy Re
form
in Korea: Background and Prospect." KDI as quoted in World Bank (198
7:35, vol. 1) for
1978 and 1982, and Nam (1984:201) for 1978.   
sass? Hong (1979:83), World Bank (1987:42, vol. 1) and Enos and Park
87As with Kim and Westphal's (1982), Nam and Young's estimates also used
direct price comparisons. Moreover, as Nam acknowledged, the estimates for
1978 are even more problematic becauseof the pervasive price controls imposed
in 1977. The divergences between Young and Nam's results, reinforce our doubts




theoutward-ortentedregimethe rom the beginning of. the governmePrecthneesce conglomerates, apparently awarePt“henn overcoming key market imperfections in the
based
costly TatinAmerion firms. Another option would have be th
however. as showtatSolution of ‘protected’
inward PDEThe
government. » Was unequivocally ruled out by
the
This renewed emphasis on thchanges in the policy regime. € jaebols involved only marginal
After a d ‘
policy, a hard core of large an. ecade of ‘big business’
already a place. The mata instrcwversified cal firms was
nvestmentlicensing. Tablsh . es 2 and 7 sh :
evenfuthermnthefree poets access-to-borrowingratio4 climesto d € lirst half of the 1970s. The f; clinedwindle in the second half of th de whet continued
 
88 As pointed out before, these fi
smaller subsidiaries were included a
gures underesti
mong the SMF. mated the jaebols' bias since
46
Government Intervention and Industrialization: Korea
also suggests that the 1960-72 trend waS maintained, with the
competitive markets share of total shipments falling to 26% i
n
1977 (table A.16). This development put Korea's levels of




Table 7: Access to Borrowing by Each Sector. Korea 1
972-841
1972. 1974 1976 1978. 1980 1982 1984
Total mnf. 45.41 45.22 40.97 39.29 38.55 32.53 28.17
L.firm (a) 45.72 45.65 41.36 39.69 39.25 32.26 27.84
§ firm(b)2 27.27 24.44 34.98 37.02 33.79 33.87 30.40
(b)-(a) 18.45 -21.20 -6.38 -2.67  -5.46 1.61 2.56
  Ratio of total bank loans and foreign loans overtotal asset of each sector.” Small and medium businessis defined as firms with fewer than 300 employees. Source: Financial Statement Analysis, BOK, as quotedby Cho and Cole (1986:26).
Like the conglomeration policy, the approach to FDI was
not
significantly changed but restrictions were made official
and
apparently reinforced, given the abrupt decline of investments
after 1973 (chart A.1). These adjustments seem to have been
triggered by a significant rise in FDI over 1972-7389, and tend to
confirm the government's option to minimise its relianc
e on
foreign firms. The ‘officialization’ of the restrictive policy ca
me
in the form of an amendmentto the FCIL (1973), whereby a ‘new’
set of criteria for FDI approval was introduced. These criteria
,
which led to a FDI‘positive list’ similar to that of pre-
1967 for
imports, consisted of a series of market, ownership, loc
alisation
and scale restrictions that continued to virtually rule out pr
ojects
that competed with domestic firms in the external and interna
l
market, or projects that the majority of the capital was owned by
foreign firms.9°
 
89 This rapid expansion seems to be caused by the diversion of J
apanese
investment from Taiwan to Korea, following Japan's normalisation of
diplomatic relations with mainland China(Il-Hwan 1987:4).
See Koo (1985:178). Moreover, restrictions on capital repatriation were
also introduced, limiting its withdrawal to two years after the initial investment,




Data on the foreign firms’ sectoral distribution, ownership
structure and share of output and exports,indicate the continuity
of the FDIrestrictive policy. The share of output and exports, for
instance, increased significantly between 1973-78, but remainedquite marginal by LDCs’ standards (table 3).2! The sectoral
distribution seems to have fo
(table A.20), with investment
and apparel to chemicals
Finally, the overwhelming
be majority ownedorco-
shifting from sectors such astextile
and electrical and electronic goods.
majority of the projects continued to
owned by local companies (table A.19).
A r_mar
The financial markets
The adjustments in the policy towards the financial marketswere confined mainly to the direction of credit allocation. Thecredit-based system remainedin place, the banks remained in thegovernment's hands, loan allocation continued to bediscretionary, and interest rates remained subsidised. The bulkof the resources, though, was concentrate on the HCI targets andon the agents that would Carty out these investments: theJaebols.
The changesin credit allocation can be said to have begun in1972 with the Presidential Emergency Decree. This decree can beviewed both as a government's response to the deleterious effectsof an IMF sponsoredstabilization (1970-71), and asa preparatorymeasure for the implementation of the HCI investments.92 Thecombination of a restrictive monetary policy and a» in an environmentof highly leconglomerates, led to a financial crisis that not only slowed theeconomy down but also put the HCI investments in danger
 
91 These figures, though a. ppearto have been strong}surge. For the sake of international comparison, during lovysetby ataeSas a percentage ofGNP was 4.7% for Argentina, 6.4% f " of FDIand 3.2% for Korea (Westphal et al. 198: 191). r Brazil, 5.6% for Mexico
The stabilization was prompted by Korea's rapjborrowing during 1968-69, reflecting the a d increase { foreibetween the f n gninterest rates (table A. 13). See Cole and Par i 983) and Amsden(loon domestic
»
llowed the move towards the HCI.
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ea
ketn, the government avoided a mar
olution winhosetobail out the debt-ridden conglomerates
and
Ss , 93
to reduce interest rates even further (table
A.13).
ese measures seemsto have been,first,
tn ithoutOetallysound conglomerates, a
move towards
the Cl ‘based in local private firms, would not b
e possi 1: d
see vad ‘that widespread business failures would dama
ge Korea
credit standing in the international market,
and accor ngly,
Ceorivethe HCI‘push’of an important source
of capital.
Despite the drastic nature of the 1972 measures, the
fent's perception appears to have been that They weregovernmgh to carry out the industrial restructuring:7 ey| Cd
terefore, complementedey aneyasthe Pee es already
loan allocation .
biasesealinthe previous subsection, let us concentfate onte
fatter As can be seen in chart 1, the HG!  beclute increase
. recedented levels, fuelled by a relative and a loans which in
ofthe so-called ‘policy loans’ (tablefeCr Investments,
majority were
Caeeeepostewith the establishment of the Nationalr
4
Investment Fund,in 1974.2
It is also worth noting that despite the greater
He,ane|Jaebor
bi cr dit allocation continued to favour ex
ports. heshareor
preferential credits to exports in total do
mestic cre
doubled during the period (table A.21).
Human capital and S&T policies
tly improve theng the need to constan
. beortive eBtteracy wasvirtually eradicated in
the 197Os
and.all other human capital indicator showed enoug
 
%8 See Cole and Park (1983:158). tal mostly of
o finance both fixed and working cap
HCls. During|974-79,renghly60% of the NFI loans were to Ht Is constituting 3 to
4.5% of the total domestic credit (World Bank 1987:111, vol. 2).
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improvement to keep Korea on the top of the NICs’ league95—the
government, with the HCI targets in mind,set out to strengthenengineering and technical education, and to improve the S&T
infrastructure to boost domestic R&D capability. A number of
research institutes specialised in HCI sectors were then
established, and the ‘Technology Development Promotion Law’,which included
a
series of fiscal incentives to private R&D, was
introduced.9® The results, at least
ost double over 1976-81, andthe number of researchers per capita more than trebled over1972-76 (table A.22),97
This renewed emphasis on indigenous technological effort wasaccompanied by a substantial increase in technology licensing,reflecting the HCIs’ higher imported technology requirements. 98Yet, contracts continued to be Carefully screened and approvedaccording to a set of priorities99, in a continuous effort toovercome informational imperfections, and to strike the rightbalance between the various and complementary ways ofachieving technological capability.
 
% Together with Taiwan, Singapore and Hong-(1991a). oP one
MOST (1988) and Leeet al (1991). The specilized institutshipbuilding, marine resources, electronics, tele utes includedand metals, chemicals and standards. The incentimavons
Kong. See table A.| and Lall
’ hine€ incentives of the TechDevelopment Promotion Law included tax exempt ndlogydepreciation for R&D equipment. Ption for R&D funds and specia
For the sake of comparison, the R&d share ofsaleless than ine (Braga and Matesco 1986) while in 1981 Koreaital 7, 1978 wasTechnology licensing outlays over 1867-71 were Iup to $96.5 million over 1872-76 and during 1977-80 reacheulto344 eninet( and Lee 1990:94). Yet, Korea's royalty payments remained well belo eenNICs such as Mexico and Brazil. eg 1977-79, Korea's pa menteedisembodied technology were only 0.17% of GNP, while Brazil's and Me 8 forwere 0.33% and 0.23%,respectively (Westphal et al. 1985: 191). °xico's99 See Enos and Park (1988:36).
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Successor failure?
troduction of this section, the HCI period
is Asstressedinmarking a shift towards a
more acethe and
. However, as shown,
iawateswerenotimwvard-looking. but there was
not such a thing
Poe ne tral. hands-off policy in the 1960s. Therefore,
far from
repr sentinga rupture, the HCI strategy can be inter
preted as a
reinuation of an interventionist, selective and
export-oriente
ontey.regime. Its results, though, remain to be as
sessed.
faelsewhere, the task of assessing the outcome 0
ASaeiicy regime in a dynamic perspective
is fraughtwith
diff ulties, not least because the counterfactual
question
5 r0 erly answered.!0° Yet, mostcritics of the HCT
strate
ue Pally looking from a neoclassical viewpoint—seems
to ee ns
doubt‘about its negative results regarding resource
allocation
export growth.
that therid Bank (1987:45, vol. 1), for instance, agrees
HCIpolicies were consistent wa eeespeg
“Chengesin
‘mixed feelings’ abou .
oneanteshalsteucture would have “occurred
too rapidly andat
excessive cost” and the substitution of bureaucrat
judges
for market tests” would haveledto idle capacity
anc owe (i088)
(incremental capital-output ratio). Likewise,
i. ass csupiel
es that the bias of credit allocation towards the
- coupled
with an overvalued exchange rate, would
have restted
overcapacity in the HCI and damaged the, ig
ort prowuy
performance, adversely affecting economic an .exp
tet By
Along similar lines, Jung-ho (1990:99) main ains
iat y
employing the HCI policy, Korea has paid a hig P
c sete” and
the weakened export competitiveness of the light in TY
ant
adds that, “The net effect of the HCI policy on t ©exp
competitiveness of the HCI seemsto have been nil or neg: .
 
100 see World Bank (1987:45,vol. 1)
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The belief, though, that the government's handling of the HCI
drive was problematic, is not a privilege of Neoclassicals. There
seems to be a widespread consensus that the demand for some
investments was overestimated, two many companies were
licensed to enter particular industries and two many industries
were targeted at the same time.!°! What generally distinguishes
the neoclassical criticism is its rather gloomy picture of the HCI
drive outcome, and its underlying assumption that the economy,
particularly exports, would have performed better had the
incentive regime been neutral and more outward-looking. Yet, if
the aforementioned microeconomic misallocations of resources
are viewed from a macroeconomic and dynamic perspective, the
neoclassical negativism does not appearto be warranted.
First, the macroeconomic performance was quite impressive.
GNPgrew 9.6% p.a. whereas manufacturing output reached 17.2%
p.a., roughly matching the previous period performance (table
A3). The fly in ointment was inflation, whose annual average
rose to 20.5%. Yet this figure was not that far from the ‘neutral’
period average (16%). The current account showed in 1977 the
first surplus since 1965 and, despite heavy investment and
foreign borrowing, the debt service ratios declined. 0 1972-79(table A.g),102 vers
Second, HCI policies were remarkably successful in expanding1
the HCI's share, not only in manufacturin, output but also inig Pp
ports. During 1972-80, the formfrom 32 to 55%, whereasthelatter rose from 24 to aes.in(808,HCI products were already accounting for more than half ofeas exports (table A.2). Moreover, the HCI import ratio fellpom 39 to 24% over 1974-80 (table A.4), suggesting, on the oneand, an irrefutable industrial deepening, and on the other, a
i
101 See, e.g. Amsden (1989), Michell (
. i 1988) and West11990: 13)aweattention to the fact that mostof the HCI fetataeOna sey p mo time (1977-78), placing unnecessary strain on the economgovernments Helmeee? Lagpeninery industry is’ one of the most cited
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considerable selectivity in this process, since the
level of imports
remained well above that of Latin American NICs.1°
Third, when export performanceis examined, the
picture that
emergesis far from disappointing. True enough, export g
rowth
declined. The annual averagerate fell from 36.5 to 19.9
% between
the 1960-72 and 1973-79 periods. However, this does n
ot seem to
be related to the strategy adopted, whose often men
tioned
problems—lack of credit for the light industries and
an
overvalued exchange rate—appear to have been overestimated
. As
noted earlier, the PPP exchange rate remained at a l
evel
considered “sufficient to sustain rapid export growth.”!04 As to
the credit bias, it is true that most ofthe incremental cred
it went
to the HCIs. However, it is also true that a similar
situation
occurred in the ‘neutral’ period and there was no tal
k of credit
starvation. Moreover, despite the obvious differenc
es in capital
intensity, the light industry's access-to-borrowing
ratio during
1973-79, was on average higher than the HCIs'. 105
The decline in export growth appears to be better ex
plained by
other supply and demandvariables of the export equ
ation. On the
supply side, the growth of the real wages abo
ve labour
productivity after 1976 (table 5), might have squ
eezed profits,
particularly in the labour-intensive light i
ndustries,
discouraging exports.!°6 To have raised the exchange rate to
make up for the higher labour cost, would have hindere
d the
 
103 tn 1979, Brazil’ HCI import ratio was 8.4% against 23.8% in 1980 K
orea
(tables A.4 and B.7).
04 Westphal (1979:27 1). Moreover, Won-Am Parkstates tha
t even though the
won,on a PPPbasis, was overvalued against the U.S. dollar throughout the w
hole
1963-1979 period, the degree of overvaluation was higher during 1963-72 than
afterwards [Exchange Rates, Wages, and Productivity in Korea. The Korean
Economic Review,vol, 2, 1987 p.19 quoted in Mihn 1988:31).
105 They were 41.0 and 40.8%,res ectively (World Bank 1987:116. Vol. II).
Moreover, as Hong (1979:71) argued, the fact that the HCI investments were
carried out by the same entrepreneurs who had been engaged in light
manufacturing, casts doubt overthe ‘starvation’ argument.
6 The profitability of the light industry (the ratio of prolits minusfinancial
expenses overcapital stock)fell from 9.9% to 3.8% over 1973-79. (World Bank,




adjustmentof the export composition to changes in therelative
factor endowment. On the demandside, the sharp reduction in the
world trade growth after the first oil shock, and the rise in
protectionism that accompaniedit, seem to have played a major
role in reducing export growth. The growth of world exports fell
from 8.7 to 4.6% p.a. between the two periods, whereas the share
of Korea's exports to developed countries under-restriction rose
from 26.7 to 32.2% over 1976-79, 107
If the aforementioned factors are taken into account and if weallow for the fact that Korea's exports outperformed thoseof thedeveloped countries and other Asian superexporters (table 8), theportrayal of the HCI policies as a disaster for exports is
unwarranted. In fact, the export performance was quiteremarkable, particularly that of the HCIs, which, despite theirinfant condition, outperformed the light industries, significantly
increasing their shareof total exports (table A.2),108
 
  
Table 8: Export performance of the East Asian NICs: 1974-79 1
Countries export value (US$) export quantum
Korea 29.4 16.1
Taiwan 23.8 14.1Singapore 27.0 11.4
Hong Kong 17.6 11.7Developed Market Economies 16.4* n.aArithmeti f
:IMF andWorldBank as etedbyBalesebeereaandUNIgy), u" 1275-79. Souree: Dats fom  
As in the 1960-72period, the im i, plausible combination of highPreecian and export growth was made possible by linking theer and access to credit to the former, by fostering
107
affectedbothea (1990) and Chang (1989:144). Thelight industry was the most
of restricted e: oteie Teasetons. Thetextile and clo ing, e.g., had their shareOvens, Re ncreased from the already high 48% in'19%6 to 5196 in 1981.
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conglomeration, and by selective protection. Protection gave the
HCIs guaranteed access to static (production and R&D) and
dynamic economies in the domestic market.109 Conglomeration
made sure that these economies would be optimised at the firm
level, and that an early entry to the export market was possible
through cross-subsidisation and price discrimination.
Selectivity gave infant exporters access to producer goods, while
avoiding a too heavy burden to upstream industries andto the
country’s limited capital and human capital resources. As before,
this arrangement was complemented by FDI protection,
subsidised and discretionary credit for exports and
manufacturing investment, and governmentdirect intervention
andincentives for indigenous technological effort.
When looked from a static viewpoint, this export-cum-
protection strategy does not appear to be economically sound.
Resource allocation is distorted and a heavy burdenis imposed on
domestic consumers. However, as Westphal (1982: 273) pointed
out, if the usual assumptions of constant static and dynamic
returns are dropped,the results can be welfare improving. Higher
export growth can lead to dynamic and static economiesthat, in
turn, would reduce unit costs and ultimately lead to lower
domestic prices. Moreover, as HCls are largely characterised by
oligopolistic structures, the strategy of forcing the entry of local
firms into the domestic and international markets might also
shift profits from foreign to local producers.! 10
The third relevant point about the HCI policy assessment,
Concerns the declining ICORs (table 9). As the standard
Heckscher-Olhin model shows, a declining productivity of capital
does not necessarily mean inefficiency. Any economy whose
relative factor endowments are changing is bound to present a
long term increase in the productivity of the ‘ex-abundant’factor,
matched by less productive ‘ex-scarce’ factor. However, due to
Short-term macroeconomic fluctuations and market failures,
eee
1
99 For a formal and stylised model of import protection as export-





Table 9: Korea’s Average Incremental Capital Output Ratios
1970-88*
1971-73 1974-77 1978-81 1982-84 1984-88
All industries 2.26 2.70 6.54 4.41 2.76
Manufacturing 1.37 1.40 2.63 1.61 na.     * Changes in output are lagged by one1 year. Both output and fixed investment are in 1980Toaee ource: World Bank (1987:152, vol.1) for 1971-84 and Lall (1991b:16) for  
this is not a smooth and inexorable process. For instance, due to
me and dynamic increasing returns, a LDC moving into theheavy industry (despite comparative advantages in the
echnologically mature sectors) will probably have theproductivity of its capital stock sharply diminished, insofar asthe MESwill be larger than thteething problems, g e initial market, and because of
Korea's option for an
particularly acute, since
ee
lll,This seems to have beenSee Amsden (1989 chap. Tl and 1 )June(ase238)aaand, Shipbuildingae Fromotion Committee, stated that “ ty 28) quoting a flocumentfromscale to reap the economies ofscal




: terather than the ‘appropriate’ technology fonooeaa cutti g edge
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norm despite the peculiarities of the HCI strategy and the leething
problems.!12
Finally, a few words aboutthe so-called counter-factual case.
As noted earlier, there is no doubt that policy mistakes happened
and that HCI drive successes could have been achieved at lesser
cost. Given that a Pareto-optimum situation is only a theoretical
possibility, one can always argue that it could have been better.
However, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that
Korea could have exploited its dynamic HCI advantages, or even
that it could have had a better economic and export performance,
had it pursued a neutral regime. First, to assume that a smooth,
‘stage-approach’ development!13 would have been possible, one
has to overlook the market imperfections stemming from the
dynamic and static economies of scale, and non-homogenous
products that characterise the HCIs, which, in turn, are
compoundedby imperfect markets for capital and technology.
This meansthat barriers to entry were high, and that without
governmentintervention Korean firms’ chances to succeed would
have been slim.!!4 Im fact, despite all government support and the
rise in labour costs, the HCI average rate of return over 1973-80
(5.1%) was very close to the light industry's (4.2%), reflecting the
difficulties in entering the industry.!15
Second, given the aforementioned obstacles, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that had the government adopted a hands-off
Policy, the transition to a more capital-intensive industrial and
 
112 This is illustrated by a comparison with the U.S. shown below. (USA=100)
Manuf. 1970 1972 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1982 1984
cap_utiliz. [ 83.2] 78.6 | 90.4 [ 94.7[ 99.0] 91.6 | 87.0] 98.7] 100.
Source: Table A.24 and OECD (1989).
; I Sce Balassa (1981) andLittle (1982).
(1987. This point is acknowledged even by the usually restrained World Bank
Sn 7:47, vol. 1) who argues that, "Without the virtually unlimited government
wiltport that wasoffered 'to the HCI investments, no private agent would have been
Tfst° bear the obviousrisks.”
Rate of return is defined as operating profit plus non-operating income






export structure would have been not onl delayed but -duced in scope. This, in turn, given the conditions of thelabourrparket during the period, would have been more of a hindrancetf an a help to the light industries. As pointed out by Bai (1982)oreas Lewisian turning point, seems to have occurred in themid-seventies when real wagesstarted to grow consistently above
Twopieces of evidence seem to su ort this hrane in tables 10 and 11 show that notwithstandinganonethree.O jaease in Korea's capital-labour ratio in manufacturingover 266-80 (Hong 1987:314), its unit labour Cost grew well aheadose of Taiwan and Singapore and the wage rate gap with the
rew 17.4 % p.a.tae meeee while for the latter, 9.6% palis In this contextot seem to be hard to predict what would have happenedwith the overall export performconcentrated on labour-intensive goods. nad exports remained
 
116Bai (1982:131) shsignificant! | Snows that the labouThelabourshareof valueaacedaire theJO Openingapplicantsueceed
ont 17Dewy32% in 1979 (EPB hb). Tted to grow rapidly after 1976 risingSpite the wage hike, Korea's. wage rate infractionofthosecithe developed countries and thereto stillKorea's hourly gic=peraat Faleayintensive industries. For instasieeaut fa 0the U.S. (UNIDO 1988), Dombush and Park(1O5yy,a OY 9.2% ofthatofcontinuum ofgoods to developthis point. “a
18 EPR (a),
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Table 10: Korea and Second Tier Table 11: East Asia’s Unit of
NICs Average Wage Rate. 1975-87. Labour Cost Index. 1976-79. .
1975 1980 1985 1987] Annual Change (%) 1976-79*
Korea 100 100 100 100 Korea 27.5
Indonesia 47 26: 27 19 Taiwan 9.4
Thailand 83 49 55 50 Singapore 3.9
US. dollars, Korea =100 *197) prices. Source: Rim, J.H. (1990b:36)
Source: UNIDO.   
 
 
All in all, by targeting the HCIs, the government prevented an
even steeper rise in labour costs than the one occurred during the
1970s, which would have compromised even further the export
performance of the light industry. Moreover, by pre-empting a
move in factor prices, helping the private sector to bridge the
financial and technological gaps between the light and heavy
industry, the government opened the way for Korea's swift
adjustment to its changing comparative advantage, placing the
country in a better position to exploit it.
IV- The liberalisation (1980-1990).
In the early 1980s, puzzlement would have been the probable
State of mind of an occasional observer of the Korean economy,
versed only on its neoclassical description, on being informed of
the governmentintentions to liberalise the economy. In fact, it
would have been no easy matter to grasp the purpose of the
liberalisation in an economy that was portrayed as one of the
best examples of an outward-looking, neutral and free trade-like
regime. The neoclassical answer to this paradox was to blame the
HCI period. The liberalisation would have been, then, a response
to the policy mistakes of the 1970s and notto those of the 1960s.
Not surprisingly, as will be shown, the government's official
explanation also followed along theselines.
The last year of the HCI period was marked by a serious po-
litical and economic crisis. Fuelled by the hectic pace of invest-
ments, wage increases above productivity (table 5) and by the
Puilding up of foreign reserves, inflation (WPI) jumped from 9 to
8.6% over 1977-79 forcing the governmentto act. In April 1979,
4 Stabilization plan was announced, but was compromised by the
Second oil shock and by the president assassination in October.
€ ensuing political and economic turmoil was aggravated in
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1980 by the perverse combination of a poor harvest and aninternational interest rate shock, which were the last straws thatpushed the economy into stagflation and BP problems.In thisyear, GNP fell by 3.7%, WPI growth shot up to 39%, and thecurrent accountdeficit reached 8.8% of GNP.119
keen to distance itself from the political and economicdifficulties inherited from its predecessor. The blame for theeconomic crisis was then conveniently laid at the door of a policythat tried to ‘pick winners’ and to substitute ‘bureaucraticjudgements for market tests’, even though the political andinternational elements of the crisis were also quite obvious. Adraft of the Fifth Five-Year Plan ( 1982-6) issued in 1981 statedthat Korea would ‘return’ to a fully fledged outward-lookingpolicy. This would mean that, “Investment choices will be left tothe initiative of the private sector and the government willprovide only the general framework in which such choices will bemade by private entrepreneurs in co-operation with theirbankers andfinanciers.”!20 an ambitious program of reformswas then launched that would limit government intervention inthe product and factor markets to ‘functional’ failures (e.g. R&Dand unfair competition).
Liber rr r;
Trade reforms
Trade liberalisation began in earnest 1983,!21 after thegovernment had succesSfully tackled the macroeconomic
 
119 See table A2 For details of the. aJung-ho(1980) and Kim, S. K. (1991) macroeconomic crisis see Amsden (1987),
20 Quoted by Balassa (1991:51),
12] The first attemptto liberalise trade happened in 1978, as part of an anti-inflationary policy. Even though it led to a noticeable reduction on NTBs andtariffs, the Korean economy began the 1980s,stil] highly protected from imports.In 1982, nearly 74% of manufactured ite were under NTBs, and 74 % of theAA items were raw materials (table A.14). The simple average tariff, 24.7% (table
cont.
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lly of two five-yearis.122 The program consisted basica
cdvaniced liberalisation schedules, one for NTBs, and one for
tariffs. The former envisioned the importSeersaeyeeeon
is, increasing from 80.4% in 0 87.7 %
andtoOB4 % by 1988. In sectoral terms.light Mhoraliced(Non,
tries were to be the first to be
POE25),Tables 12 and A.9 show that both macro and sectoral
targets were virtually attained, except, perhaps for primary
goods.
 
       
Table 12: Korea's Import Liberalisation Ratio by Industry (1983-
= Oe 1988 19891983 1985
Smarrconde 73.2 78.2 (77.8) 75.3 (80.5) 74.2
Chemicals 94.4 95.6 (95.7) 100 (99.6) 100
Textiles 80.4 93.1 (90.4) 98.8 (97.8) 99.5
Steel & metal 90.9 95.6 (94.9) 100 (100) 100
Machinery 68.7 83.0 (83.2) 100 (100) 100
Electric & electronic 53.6 73.8 (73.9) 100 (100) 100
Others 81.2 82.8 (83.7) 94.9 (88.2) 94.9
Total 80.4 87.7 (87.7) S47 - 25.9
i i ivi i items (CCCN 8 digit). Numbers in parenthes
penedSoaresYoung(98827,Koo(98424),Wor Bank (1987, vol. 1:61), KFTA (1988:4) and 
 
d from 23.7% inAs for tariffs, the average rate was to be reduce
1983, to 20.6% by 1984 and 16.9% by 1988.!25 As shown in table
13, tariff rates in 1988 were a bit off target, particularly given the
A. 10), was still well above the 6% OECD average. Moreover, ERP estimates show a
substantial increase over 1978-82 (table 6). See Kim,S. (1991). :
2 The stabilization policies involved, first, a 17% devaluation associated
with a wage squeeze. Second, interest rates wereraised,ayelttodlomesti¢and
foreign credit restricted and the budget de ina’ ion e
me id drop in inflation (WPI) which fell to 0.2% in .
addition,bosstedbethe devaluation and by a strong import demand in the US.,
€xports resumed high growth while imports faltered, improving the curren
accountcondition (table A.8). See Amsden (1987).
Moreover, the program projected a reduction in the dispersion of the tariff
rates, bringing, in 1988, the overall range of 0-150 % down to compressed su
ranges of eG % for raw material, 20 % for interme diate products and capita
€00ds, and 20-30 % for consumer goods. IMF(1984:300).
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increase in the coefficient of variation that was Supposed to godown. Yet, it can be said that, overall, the changes in tariffprotection were very muchin line with what was planned. Theannouncementof the tariff schedule, coincided with the reform ofthe tariff deduction scheme, which aimed at attenuating itsindustry-specific character. Except for the export drawback,deductions were then limited to 55-65% of the tariff rate andrestricted to facility equipment and machines. In addition, the
 
 
       
Table 13: Korea's legal Tariff Rates by Sector. 1979-931979 1983 1984 1988 1989 1993Agricultural products n.a 31.4 29.6 25.2 20.6 (16.6)Nonagricultural goods na 22.6 20.6 16.9 11.2 (6.2)Raw material n.a 11.9 n.a 9.5 n.a. n.a.Intermediate goods} na 21.5 n.a 17.1 n.a, n.a,Finished goods n.a 26.4 n.a 18.9 n.a. n.a.All products 24.7 23.7 21.9 18.1 12.7 (7.9)
(20.6) |(16.9)Coeff. of variation! 0.69 na. 0.61 0.64 n.a.
|
(0.75)
Source:Yoon (danteae (G9886), EPBCrowesTie984)andfaeaa  
On the export side, the aim wasto limit the amountof subsidyto match the decline in protection. This was done mainly by
export loans to the level of the12 Yet, exporters continued to
general rate (tables A.13 and A.12).
r alia, from preferential access to short (until 1988
benefit, inte
 
According to Kim's (1991) estimates shsubsidies were eliminated in 1983. However, this temsfobeeasels“anet exportinterest rate subsidy was calculated using the commercial banks’ & since therate, which, notwithstanding the liberalisat; general loan
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and in the SMF's case up to now) and long term loans, and from
tax free reserves. !26
| in subsidies was accompanied by the introduction of a
‘dirtfloating exchange rate, linked to a multicurrency basket.
This system led the PPP exchange rate to rise during 1984-85,
probably offsetting the reduction on export subsidies (table A7).
From 1986, though,given the diplomatic pressures caused by a
huge commercial surplus with the U.S., the government was
forced to appreciate the won, even though, in a PPP basis, it
remained below its historical average. In March 1990,after being
identified under the U.S.trade act as ‘currency manipulator’ (MTI
1990b:18), the Korean government adopted the so-called market
middle rate system’ that was supposedto be intervention-free.!:
Industrial organisation reforms
The government's long-standing ‘interference’ with the
developmentof the industrial structure was also to be abandoned
or ‘neutralised’. That is, the anti-FDI, pro-jaebol and sectoral
biases that until then had marked the government industrial
policy were no longer desirable.
The reforms began with the FDI policy. In 1980, new sectors
were opened to foreign firms and restrictions on projects wholly
owned by foreigners were relaxed (Koo, 1985:179). In 1984 the
positive list turned negative. As with import controls, all the
 
 
126 f April 1989, the major tax freeYoung (1987, 1989) and (USTIC 1985). As of Ap
reserves were Ce overseas market development, price fluctuations and export
oods inventory. As for long term credits, they are provided by the Korea
Eximbank for post-shipment financing or imports of producer goods, usually at
an interest rate below that of the international market. Finally, exporters also
continued to benefit from institutions like the KOTRA and Korea Tradersassociation.
According to this system, the exchange rate is set each day based in themiddle rate prevailing in the interbank market in the previous day within"certain" limits. The liberal nature of this new scheme seemsto be disputable. Asthe Financial Times (1990:11) put it by “giving the overwhelming powerof theBank of Korea in the tiny foreign exchange market—average turnover US$ 200million—claims that they can no longer influence the exchange rate are beingtreated with scepticism at home and abroad."
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sectors not in the ‘negative list’ were to be ‘fully’ open to FDI,although not necessarily automatically approved.!28 Thenegative list was to be phased out until the early 1990s. As of1989, the government was claiming that 97.5% of the manufac-turing sectors was open to FDI. In addition, the restrictions oncapital repatriation and on foreign ownership ratios were alsoabolished, and the range of tax incentives available expanded(Bark 1989: 15),129
followed later on by other anti
finance (in 1984, the top thirty
bank credit was frozen, and groups whose debtexceeded 500% have their acces
 
To qualify for the AA syst .
shareof less than 50%, amountup io bsg °F nad to havexemptions.
See Il-Hwan (1987:8) for incentive detail: Ss. In March 1991, a Notification
Setewas onPlemented and FDI incentives substantially reduced. This new
pyst ownepees to automatic approve projects in the liberalised sectors, whose
gn Tship is css eanmeh eu cascs, the foreign investors “will beit notifyin € contents of ththe authorities concerned. i :7) On portfolio investmentunepen the marketto foret :t dealing by forei 1, thouers through doners, though, was post dthange t postponed to1987, butwere tightened in 1989 whenfee only began to'beclaxed as late as1986, began to wither away. See Amsden and.Buh(issn surplus, ee arose in
See FEER (1985, December 12 and 1988 hort(1987, vol. I: 93).
e a foreign equity3 million, and not require tax
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later), theApart from the financial sector reforms (taken up
sectoral bias of the governmentsPolleywastobe tackledmainly
through changes in fiscal incentives, ; tives (e@. tox
and made sector neutral. At first, direct tax incen ‘ . te
ions) were phased out and replaced by indirect ones(e.g.
referential depreciation). nese. OREadusinyepeeon
. , tivities, notably ,
incentives being restricted to fewer ‘strategic’ sectors Rhee
1987).!31 In 1986, the search for neutrality went further with c
seven existing industry-specific promotion laws being cep ace
by the Industry Development Law. This law, instead o prinie
‘strategic’ industries, only specified two broad categories entitle
for government support, i.e., sectors that “would be difficult to
attain international competitiveness despite a comparative
advantage for the Korean economy” and “structurally inefficient
declining industries in which Korea is gradually losing
competitiveness.” Government intervention in these categories
waslimited to 3 years. !32
Liberalisi r_ market
Financial sector
n the financial market, the liberalisation began with a
package of measures aimed at minimising the Erermene
controls over credit allocation, and at reducing its jaebol and HC
biases. This package included the privatisation of the
commercial banks (1981-83), the relaxation of the requirements
for establishing non-banking financial institutions (NBFI), and
the unification and overall increase of the interest rates (table
 
 
131 ected strategic industries were naphtha cracking, iron and steel,
machines”. Slectvontes shipbuilding and aviation industry. As of 1984. the
‘Unctional incentives included accelerated depreciation, preferential fisca
tmentofreserves for various purposes and losses, and exemption or reduction
of income taxes. The activities eligible included SMF investment, R&D and©verseas investment or other overseas operations (BohnYoung 1984:36).
Kim, J. (1989:35). The decisionsto intervene in a specific sector were now
to be made vot only by government ministries but also by 21 new advisory.Councils under the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) acgis, made up o
entrepreneurs, academics and public researchers (World Bank 1987,vol.1).
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A.13). These measures were complemented by the decisiearmark 35% the commercial bank credit and55% of thelocalbank loans to SMFs,andto phaseout the policy loans (includingshort-term export loans), which, as result, had their Share ofdomestic credit reduced from around 60 to 45% over 1979-86(table A.21). These measures were apparently successful inreducing the HCIeduc gp and large firm biases in credit allocation (chart
Human capital and S&T
The government conversion to liberal economics did not go far
lures in human
and according} ,a further shift| did not distort relative Prices. Predicting, then,nintensive sectors, theyonnne atvantage towards technology-. the government stengineering and Scie Stepped up investments ini : ntific education,nfrastructure. Both the R&D share of GNP andthe numberof
133 For details see, e.g. BOK (19859 Vek. ’ Cc134 in 1980, the stock market nn ‘ oleand Cho (1986) and Kang(1989).started then to grow steadily reaching 14 3907 9°, Of GNP was a 91989. In 1984, the same figure for Japontoe qin
of
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researchers per capita more than doubled over the period (table
A.22).
There were, though, important changes in the implementation
of this policy. In a bid to increase private R&D outlays, financial
and fiscal incentives were greatly increased, which undoubtedly
contributed to the rise in the private sector’s share of total R&D
from 32 to 81% over 1980-88.!35 There were also institutional
changes, with state research institutes being merged for the sake
of greater efficiency in R&D management, and the division of
labour between these institutes, universities and the private
sector were more clearly defined. Universities were to concentrate
on basic science; government institutes were to provide a link
between the universities and the private sector, while focusing on
the development ‘core and original’ technology of ‘national
interest’; and private firms were to undertake ‘commercial’ R&D
(MOST 1988 andLee etal. 1991). 186
Alongside the drive to promote indigenous technological
effort, restrictions on technology licensing were eased, with the
governmentraising the ceiling on the value of contracts needing
approval, and exempting an increasing number of industries
from the restrictions (Enos and Park 1988:37). As a result, and
given the changesin the industrial structure, royalty payments
more than doubled between 1977-81 and 1982-86,187
 
 
135 The preferential tax treatment for R&D(i.e. tax credit or exemption,tariff
€xemption and preferential depreciation) was extended to foreign engineer's
Wages, corporation tax of research institutes, reserve funds for technology
development, research facility investments, job training expenses, imports ofR&D equipment, royalties from technology ‘sales and venture business. The
financial incentives included preferential loans from the KDB and Small andMedium Industry Bank, direct subsidies from special government funds, as well
as loans and equity investments from venture capital companies set up by the
Sovernment (Rhee 1987).
th Other measuresincluded the setup of‘science towns’ (4 were planned untila \¢ year 2000) to take advantageofexternalities associated with localisation, and
al ng Range Plan of Science and Technology towards the 2000's”, which, interenvisage R&D expenditures at 3% of GNP. See Most (1988).





Considering the evidence above, it seems undeniable thatKorea has moved into a policy regime closer to the neoclassicalideal. The burning questions, though, are to what extent andunder what circumstances. To answer these questions becomesparticularly important given Korea's impressive export, BP andoverall macroeconomic performance during the liberalisation.
Exports grew 12.2% p.a. over 1980-89, outperforming those ofthe ‘world’ (4.1%) and middle-income countries (5.4%),!38 On the
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The dislocation-free hypothesis seemsto be further confirmed
by three other pieces of evidence. First, by the data on sectoral
production and employment, showedin table 15. The picture that
emerges from this table—with all sectors presenting significant
growth in output, employment and establishments— is in sharp
contrast, e.g., to Chile's experience of the 1970s.!49 There, the
liberalisation program led to a radical change in the industrial
structure, with seven out of 20 manufacturing sectors having
lower levels of production in 1980 than in 1970 (Edwards,
1985:232). Second, by the stability of Korea's import composition,
which in 1989 wasstill dominated by capital and intermediate
 




Sectors imports / domestic production imports / domestic supply








Mining 936.9] 517.8 324.6 330.9 85.0 83.4 77.0 77.5
Food, bev. & tobacco] 7.5 5.6 5.7 6.6 7.1 5.4 5.6 6.5
 
Textile and leather 5.4 7.3 7.7 8.4 7.9 11.5 12.4 13.6
  
 
























Basic metal 21.8 18.7 22.6 22.7 21.6 19.0 21.3 21.1
Metal and machinery 50.3 37.3 35.2 34.9
|]




Source: Bank of Korea, Korea's Input-Output Tables.
 
§00ds (table A.15). Finally, by the estimates for the income








and its average declined between the 1970-79 and 1980-88
141   
15: s te Growth ta
of Establishments by I . 1980-89 (%),!
t
1985 Won employmen units Manuf. value added
bev. tobacco 7.7 2. 0.2
ber
11.6
Annual compound average rate.
EPB tb).
1980-1988. Total does not add te zero due to rounding. Source: EPB (a) and
If Korea was not flooded by imports,it was not sw.either. Table 16 show that, t amped by FDIdespite the moreliberal legislation, by
 
141 For the 1970-7
1.26 and varied betweenO98ictpeaaverage clasticity {arithmetical mean) waswhereas for 1980-and the range 0.64-0.83. The regression equations. forthetars criods wero= periods were,(1) Mz-0SHten ONP (2) M=7.86+0.25 GNPR2=0,96 (5.10) (16.5)
. whereas M is im R*=0.98dollars. Ports and GNPis the gross national Product both at 1985 US
70
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the end of the 1980s, its FDI indicators continued totrail badly
those of the other NICs and second-tier NICs. Figures for the
foreign firms' shares of each industrial sector were not available,
but if we take into account that the FDI share of gross domestic
capital formation during 1979-85, was below that of the 1966-78
period, an educated guess would be that Korea's industry has not
suffered from denationalisation either (table A.17).
Table 16: Foreign Direct Investment Stocks: Values and Relative to GDP.
Country Year Stock" _%ofGDP|| Country Year Stock!  %ofGDP
  
Korea 1987 2.8 2.3 Mexico 1987 19,3 13.6
Taiwan 1988 8.5 8.1 India 1984* 1.1-1.5  0.6.-0.7
Hong Kong 1985* 6.0-8.0 20-26 Thailand 1986* 4.0-5.0 10.5-13.1
Singapore 1986 9.4 53.8 Indonesia 1987 7.9 11.3
Brazil 1987 28.8 9.6 Kenya 1984 0.6 12.0
‘ US$ 10? *estimated. Source: Lall (1990, table 4)
 
The overall result of these trends, limited inflow of FDI
notwithstanding, was a dramatically improved BP, with Korea
having in 1986, not only its first trade balance surplus since the
Korea war, but also a current account surplus. As both surpluses
persisted for four years, Korea wasable to reduce considerably the
burdenofits foreign debt (table A.8). To complete the rosy picture,
the external balance improvement took place in a high-growth
(10% p.a.) and low-inflation environment (5.2% p.a.), with the
€conomy roughly matching the growth performanceof the previ-
AS) periods, while presenting a superior inflation record (table
If the neoclassical assessmentof the HCI drive is accepted, theTational follow-up would be to attribute all this remarkable©conomic performance to the efficiency gains produced by theliberalisation. One could say that the reinstatement of a neutral,Cutward-looking incentive regime led the economy back to the‘ight relative prices, and the rapid export and overall growth thatOllowed were its logical consequence. !42 The trouble with this
yreee2 ‘




interpretation, though,is that it has both empirical and logicalproblems.
First, as the previous sections have shown,one could not talkof a return to an outward-looking, hands-off policy since the HCIstrategy was solidly committed to export growth, and Korea hadnever had a neutral incentive regime.!43 Second, despite the‘distortions’, the performance of Korea's exports and economyduring the 1960s and 70s was as good asthat of the 1980s, exceptperhapsfor inflation. And third, if it is assumed that Korea's
HCI drive was a complete failure, wh was th® t .market-led economy virtually dislocationfree?” ransil
A more consistent explanation, capable of deal' inpoints raised above, hasto take into account both theellictoresof the past government intervention
the liberal reforms S, and the timid character of
The efficiency of previous interventions.
‘43.43 These points are aKor mm mazingly underpinned bthe “ecoomnC poltey Ortance: in1989,the deputy pater minioteggesatesregime of those days has also given rive ‘Os as follow: "The €conomic policywere promoted, and imports restrict,
Exportsromote import substitution. Impe iS weregree forelgn deange and to
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strong local firms—nurtured by decadesof protection, abundant
long-term credit, export-orientation discipline, and supported by
an increasingly sophisticated human capital stock and S&T
infrastructure—liberal reforms would have played havoc in the
Korean manufacturing sector, hampering the economyability to
adjust to changes in comparative advantages. On the other hand,
after achieving a competitive and diversified industrial structure,
continuation of widespread intervention would be ill-advised
because key market failures had already been overcome, and
because of the dangerof ‘governmentfailure’ in administering an
increasingly complex economy.
The lack of major dislocations during the 1980s liberal
reforms comes aS an important evidence to support this
interpretation. As Chile's experience has shown, had government
intervention not been efficient and market-failure oriented,
Korea would have found it difficult to maintain a virtually
uninterrupted two-digit export growth for another decade, let
alone its overall growth and inflation record. The limited
adjustment costs, however, cannot be entirely ascribed to the
efficiency of the government's past policies. It has also a bearing
on the gradualist approach of the reforms, and on the government
persisting determination to intervene, both functionally and
Selectively, wherever market failures were still relevant despite
the liberalism of its rhetoric.
How gradual and liberal were the reforms?
The product market.
Beginning with trade reforms, Korea took more than a decade
to do less than Chile did in five years. While the latter removed all
he NTBs and reduced all tariffs to a uniform 10% in a 5-year
Period (Edwards, 1985:231), the former, as late as 1987 . had close
to 30% (in value terms) of manufactured importsstill under




Behind these figures seems to have been a Strategy that wasboth cautious andselective. Cautious becauselocal firms were notonly given plenty of time to adjust to competition in their homemarket, but were also assured by safeguards in the tradelegislation that any major dislocation would be avoided.!44Selective because industries where the Static and dynamicadvantages of a protected domestic market were substantial werethe last to be liberalised, and in some cases only partially. The‘new technology’ industries are a case in point. They werefavoured with special laws that effectively barred imports ofitems like computers, telecommunication equipment,Semiconductors, machine tools and electronic consumergoods. !45
: Alter 1987, the prudence and SelectiviStrategy was somewhat compromised by hea ressure fromKorea’s biggest trade pattern—the U.S.—whieh forced a swiftremoval of NTBs and contingency safeguards (tables A.14, A.9
ty of the government's
preparedto live passively with the vagaries of a free trade re imparticularly when this means competing with foreign firms
 
144 Import liberalisation was accom anied by a build-up of ° ’safeguards. The government added a new''ad ustment’ tariff (uy to 100%eftheeleg tariff) to the already existent arsenal o ‘emergency’tariffs, import quotas,Weport surveillance, special laws, anti-dumping and countervailing duties. SeeorldBank (1987:71, vol. 1) and Young (1987:52) for details.In the case of computers,for instance, the government introduced in 1982
» micro and personal computers, together with itsmainframes’ were permitted only ifOreover, the regulation gave MOST theperipherals where appropriate. Theinnersnase Korean-made computers andin 1988, but the governthent ar ¢ imports of computers were finally liberalisedthe sectors mentioned were allgrantedwagneme oPened in place. The rest of( 1986). Allgeier (1988) and Evans and Teretlosee legislation. See, °-8 ChungSee MT] (1880b) and Young(1988, 19relations. In addition to NTB removal. an
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which have time, scale, technology, a well functioning capital
market and a developed S&T infrastructure on their side (and not
seldom their own governments). Therefore, amid a return to a
trade and current-account deficit caused by the combined action
of speedier liberalisation, currency appreciation, and higher
labour unit costs, Korea resorted again to NTBs to stop imports,
particularly of consumergoods.!47 The NTBs took the form of a
tacit anti-import campaign, which used the jaebols’ tight control
over distribution to curb imports. 148
On the industrial organisation side, the reforms could not be
more pragmatic. Despite all the talk about enhancingtherole of
the price mechanism, the government continued to play a key
role in shaping Korea's industrial structure and controlling theinflux of FDI. This was already evident in the beginning of the
decade, when the government decided to bypass a marketsolution
to correct the HCI drive excesses. Commercial banks were
‘persuaded’ to support mergers and capacity reduction programs
in the distressed sectors, whatever their expected returns. The
underlying reasoning, as Young (1986:52) put it, seems to have
been that industrial adjustment had to precede import
liberalisation and not vice-versa. As in its ‘damned’ past, the
government was again trying to prevent that the weaknessof the
Capital markets and their short-termism put years of capabilitybuilding in danger. !49
 
147 Sec tables A.7 and A.8.
148 PEER (1990, July 19), for instance reports two incidents occurred during1990, involving U.S.-made refrigerators and cars. It is worth noting that up to1989, the reformsdid little to establish a more competitive market in foreigntrading, wholesale and retailing. Until that year, trade licenses were conditional©n export performance and were restricted to foreign companies that hadProduction facilities in Korea. In addition, only nine out of 66 retail andwholesale business categories were open to foreign investors. See EPB (1989).
The major industries involved in the 1980-83 reestructuring programWere : heavy power-generating equipment(reduction in the number ofproducers):wolor Vehicles (mergers and market segmentation): shipbuilding (market©gmentation); fertilisers (mergers and capacity reduction); electronic exchangeuction in the number of producers); smelting of copper (mergers); ship inmergers and capaci reduction). See, e.g., World Bank (1987,vol. I), Rhee (19and FEER(1981 dure, 5). 8 hem
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The government determination to continue to intervene wasalso written ‘all over’ the 1986 Industrial Development Law (IDL),despite assurancesto the contrary.!50 The use of loose categoriessuch as ‘sunrise’ and ‘sunset’ industries, left plenty of room forthe government to intervene to avoid the occasional Sociallydamaging market solution. That is what happened for instance,between July 1986 and December 1987, when no fewer than eightindustrial sectors were designated for a three-yearrationalisation program under the IDL provisions, with thegovernment bailing-out financially distressed firms, anddefining the sectors’ number of competitors and overallcapacity.!5! again, in a context of imperfect capital markets, the
long-drawn-out market Solution, with its potentially disruptiveeffects in terms of bankruptcies, asset-stripping anddenationalisation.
scale and scope being neither temporary nor ‘Treparable’, it is notSurprising that the government's actions fell well short of itsrhetoric. To begin with, the Fair Trade Act did not restrictconglomeration (Lee 1986). Second, the majority of the credit anddiversification restrictions, were elther relaxed by the gov-ernment or skirted by the jaebols. In the case of the former both
needs, and the jaebols used the financial liberalisation todiversify into the financial sector. As to diversification,restrictions were apparently side-stepped by starting-up
 
150 The World Bank (1987: 106,vol. 1), e.g. stated that the IDL lacked, “Amechanism for explicitly picking winners.”
! The sectors selected were textile & fabrics, ferro-alloys, dying andfertiliser, as sunset industries; and automobiles, diesel engines, heavy electricalequipment and heavy construction equipmentas the sunrise ones (Kim, J.H.1989). In an interview with FEER (August4, 1988), Korea's finance minister Stated
that between 1986-87, the governmentbailed-out 78 bankrupt companies, withthe government and commercial banks writing-off US$1.36 billion in debts, and
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nominally independent companies using ‘retired’ senior
executives (FEER 1988, Sept. 29). More to the point, as noted
earlier, the government's own reestructuring exercises continued
to promote concentration as a meansto achieveefficient market
structures. !52
No wonder economic concentration continued to rise. Both the
top 5 and 30 jaebols increased their share in total shipments
during 1977-85.!53 In 1985, the competitive markets’ share of the
total shipments still amounted to only 37.8%, slightly better
than in 1977, but still lower than in 1970 (table A.16). In addition,
the ratio of the top 10 jaebols’ sales to GNP climbed from 48.1 to
68.3% over 1980-89. 154
Finally, on FDI deregulation, the government did not take the
naive view that Korean firms were prepared to face the imperfect
TNCs competition in its own market, without any sort of
safeguard. Despite the changeover to the negative list and the
increase in the numberof deregulated sectors, when one takes
into account other scant buttelling evidence, the general impres-
Sion is that the governmentcontinuedto be very much in control,
deciding when, where and in what terms FDI would take place.
For instance, investments in sectors not listed were still
Subject to screening, unless it was majority owned bylocal firms,
and relatively small (under $3 million). Investments would not be
allowed to go forward if the sector in question was under
 
 
152 4 1988 EPB survey revealed market entry regulations in 84 industries,aon controls in 26, equipment regulations in 10 an quantity regulations in 15RER, 1988: 75).
15 Lee et al (1986) and PCRER (1988). The data for exports present a similartrend, with the share of the five largest groups increasing from 24% to 27% during1977-85, despite the two-digit export growth (PEER September 29, 1988).
FEER (1990, March 1). This indicator cannot be taken as an absolutemeasure of economic concentration because of the double-counting problem.rther evidenceof the increase in concentration is the 1988 presidential reportat Hephasised that, "Conglomerates dominate entire markets not only formaterials, manufacturing, and assembly butalso for sales, trade, finance, andreal estate by taking advantage of superior financing ability and informationTesources," PCRER(1988:72).
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‘rationalisation requirements’, which, as of January 1989, in-
cluded key sectors such as textiles, ferro alloy, fertilisers,
automobiles, diesel engines, heavy electrical equipment andheavy construction equipment (MTI 1990b). Still depending on
the sector aimed, investments could also face export, localcontent and local equity participation requirements, !55 Lastly,at least until 1987, foreign investors hadto live without effectiveprotection for intellectual property. It was only in 1987 thatKorea enacted a series basic intellectual property laws, but eventhen problemsof enforcementled the governmentto establish theIntellectual Property Rights Task Force in December 1988, 156
Factor markets
In the financial markets, as the above analalready suggested, the government continued iohaveaStranginfluence in credit conditions and allocation, despite thecommercial banks privatisation and other deregulatingmeasures. Behind this apparent contradiction lies what can becalled a two-track financial deregulation. Whereas the NBFIs hadestablishment requirements, loan allocation policy and interestrates semi-deregulated in 1985, the commercial banks, as late as1990, still had to cope up with Ministry of Finance's suggestionsconcerning their officers, loans and interest rates, 157
 
155por examplple, as of 1985, 100% foreign owned electronics manufacturerswere obliged to export at least 50% oftheir production (USITC 1985), whereas uto January 1990, sectors like excavators, heavy electrical equipment, dieselengines, optical fibres and electronic switching systems were subject to localequity participation requirements (MTI 1990b). Korean companies that wereauthorised tosell foreign goodsor uselicensed trade marks were also subject toexport requirements. See USTIC (1985). These and other restrictions weresomewhatrelaxed in the beginning of the 1990s, under the ‘Super 301 Accords’with the U.S.. |
156 Epp (1989:23). As if the regulations were not enough, foreign investor also
had to face an unsympathetic bureaucracy very keen on tax audits on foreign
companies. See Financial Times (1990, May 16) and FEER (1989, June 15).
57 In December 1988, the ceiling on most lending and deposit rates for
instruments with maturities of more than two years werelifted. However,
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Even though this asymmetry of the financial reforms can be
justified on the grounds of the banks' high proportion of non-
performing loans (mainly for shipbuilding and construction),
there is no doubt that it also allowed the government to maintain
control, directly or indirectly, over the majority of the loanable
funds.!58 In fact, some of the key 1960s' and 1970s'
characteristics of the financial system were well and alive during
1980s.
For instance, credit allocation continued to be highly se-
lective. Resources continued to be channelled into manufacturing
investment, ‘strategic’ sectors and activities, at rates still below
the private opportunity cost. As noted earlier, banks wereforced,
their financial health notwithstanding, into a virtually
permanent industrial ‘reestructuring’ program. The ‘new’
technology sectors were particularly favoured, and exporters
continued to have preferential access to credit. Moreover, as the
unification of interest rates was not accompanied by their
deregulation, bank credit continued to carry a reduced butstill
significant financial subsidy. As of 1989, the difference between
the general loan and the deregulated corporate bond rates, ranged
from 2.7 and 5.7% dependingon the client credit-worthiness.!59
Moreover, there are signs that credit allocation continued to
favour large firms. Even though, as noted earlier, the anti-jaebol
and pro-SMF measures seem to have had some success in
reducing this bias until 1984 (table 7), we have already given two
§00d reasonsto believe that this is tendency was reversed after
1985. Thatis, the periodical relaxation of the credit controls, and
the jaebols' diversification into the financial sector. The first
Teason is particularly relevant after 1985, when credit controls
were significantly relaxed because of the collapse of one major
Conglomerate. This seems to be confirmed by the data available,
—
th 158 The governmentdirect and indirect control over loanable funds(ratio ofwe deposits at commercial banks and developmentinstitutionsto total deposits)she 71% in 1980, 70.2% in 1985 and 42% in 1989 (BOK c). Table A.21, in turn,Ows that as of 1986, the share of policy loans wasstill 45%.
als KDI (199 1:24). As of 1986, the gap concerning the curb market rates was9 sizeable, amounting to 14.3% in real terms (table A.13).
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which showsthat the top ten jaebols' share of total borrowingjumped from 25 to 53% over 1986-89 [FEER (19(1980, March 1)]. (1988, Sept. 29) and
The second reason was very much a result oftwo-track liberalisation. The NBFIs not onl phe government
banksin the financing of manufacturing investment, forced bystrong government‘guidance’ and conglomerate ownership. !61
The last point on the factor market liberalisation concerns thefunctional’ S&T policy. Even though, in theory, thegovernment's higher investments and incentives couldhavebenefited all firms in all sectors, in practice ‘strategic’technology-intensive industries were the main beneficiaries. For
 
16080K (1985:25), for instance, states that "...most of insurance com anics,and large short-term credit companies are owned or controlled by the industria]groups". Despite regulations that limited the maximum ownership of any singleshareholder to 8% of thetotal capital, not even the commercial banks seem tohave escaped fromjaebol dominance. As of 1986, the top 10 jaebols held to etherbetween 22.4% to 56.5% of each commercial bank's capital. Individual holdingsin certain cases were as high as 23.8%. See World Bank (1987:92,vol. 1)
In 1991, the government was again using its control over banks to force
the Jacbols to reduce the scope of their business and increase therefore the
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instance, on top of import protection noted earlier, industries
such as computers, semiconductors, telecommunications and
machine-tools were particularly favoured by government
procurement, and by direct subsidies coming from special
government funds, set up to develop ‘key technologies’. Most of
these funds were linked to the so-called ‘National R&D Projects’,
where the developing costs were usually splil between the
government and hand-picked private firms, with the former
typically bearing most of the expenses.!62 So, under the guise of
‘functional’ S&T policies, the government not only continued to
intervene to prop up local technology effort, but it did so by
clearly targeting industries seen as having the potential to bring
externalities and dynamic comparative advantages.
Summing up.
From the arguments outlined above, it seems quite clear that,
despite the official rhetoric, the Korean government convertion
to the liberal cause was far from dogmatic. For all the advances
towards a moreliberal regime, one cannot help noticing that far
from becoming an anathema, government intervention
continued to be usedselectively, and to be largely driven by the
aim of givinglocal firms the best possible chance of succeeding in
the domestic and international markets. Market solutions or
liberal models were only adopted when the government was sure
that, instead of letting local firms disadvantaged because of




162 During 1982-88, the governmentinvested $311 million in National R&D
Mrs against $218 million for the private sector. As of September 1989, theTI was about to set-up a new five-year technology development project thatwould include microelectronics, machine tools, robotics, aerospace, newmaterials, fine chemicals, laser and biotechnology (FEER 1989, Sept. 28). In anterview to Korea Trade & Business (November1 89), the director of MT] Importholicy Division explained why the government was tar eting technology -ntensive industries. “The comparative advantage of the industries amon fheSian newly industrialised economies will be shifted from textile, shipbuildingand iron & steel, to knowledge-intensive industries such as automobile,machinery andelectronics in the 1990s. On the other hand, advanced countrieswil €ep the comparative advantage in areas such as biotechnology andCrospace.,"
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In the product markets, the government continued seekprotection, within the trade relations constraints, to thatindustries where dynamic andstatic economies of scale whererelevant, and this included not only trade barriers but also FDI
V-Theoverall picture.
The history of Korea's industrialisation can
the first decadesofthis century when under Japaneseseeeacktoa sizeable and diversified industrial structure wasbuilt. Althoughimpressive, the shortcomings of this ‘colonial industrialization’became clear after WWII, when the Japanese withdrawal leftKorea with limited industrial skills, with a poorly integrated in-dustrial structure and without its main market. The North-Southsplit followed by the civil war made things worse, with Korealosing most of heavy industry and power Supply to the North, andhaving what was left of its industrial base, destroyed. Thegovernment’s response was to adopt an IS ‘strategy’, whichsucceeded in rebuilding the light industry and in improving the
human capital stock, but that failed to deliver growth and reducedependency on aid. This, however, appears to have been not so
much the result of a ‘disastrous’ industry and trade bias, but the
inexorable outcome of a situation that combined the difficultiesof learning and reconstruction, with a government more
interested in its political survival, than in removing the market
failures blocking industrial and economic development.
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The 1960s saw the military taking over and responding to the
failures of the 1950s with what became known as an outward-
oriented policy regime. Building on the industrial reconstruction
of the IS period, this strategy was remarkably successful in
promoting industrial, export and economic growth. Neoclassicals
were quick to attribute this success to the allegedly neutral,
hands-off and outward-lookingtraits of the new regime. Yet, even
though the regime was undoubtedly outward-oriented, and the
economy was opened up, it was not market, industry or firm
neutral, nor protection for the domestic market was low. Behind
this paradox was concerted government action to overcome
market failures in the product and factor markets, which allowed
Koreato fully exploit the advantages of an open economy, without
the drawbacksofa free-trade regime.
In the product market, a selective trade regime was set up,
which granted exporters free access to producer goods at world
prices, while offering the light industries and selected heavy
industries an exclusive domestic market where to reap static and
dynamic economies. This was complemented, first, by a
conglomeration policy that optimised these economies at firm
level, and that allowed an early entry to the export market via
Cross-subsidisation and price discrimination. And second, by a
restrictive FDI policy, which protected local firms and
Capabilities from the imperfect competition of TNCs, and secured
a prompt private sector's response to local incentives. In the
factor market, government intervention ensured that
Manufacturing investment and exports would not be hindered by
the lack of properfinancing or interest rates above the socially
desirable, and was also instrumental in forging local
conglomerates. Finally, intervention also prevented the
acquisition of technological capabilities from being hampered by
a poor stock of human capital, poor S&T infrastructure or by
ocal-firms’ under-investment in indigenous technological
orl.
In the 1970s, concerned mainly with factor price changes, the
G0vernment promoted a shift in the industrial structure towards
the HCIs. Contrary to what Neoclassicals claim, this ‘push’ did
Not involved major alterations in the policy regime. It remained
Sulward-oriented—the very reason of the ‘push’ was to maintain
igh export growth in the face of changing comparative
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Even though policy mistakes happened, the ‘HCI push’, sh’ resultshadlittle to do with the apocalyptic picture that its crities like to
result would have been a poor industrial and export perfnot only in the 1970s but throughout the 1980s. pomormance.
Finally, in the 1980s the government m
, , oved to liberalise thPolicy regime, amid a misleading and politically convenientcr am of state intervention in the previous decade. Ifanyt ing, by Overcoming market failures in the product and
from fully exploiting its stati Prevent Koreaadvantages. 6 ae and dynamic
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Appendix
Table A.2: Shares of Heavyand Chemical (HCI) and of Light Industries in
\ Korea’s Manofacturing Output, Value Added and Manufactured Exports.
1953.89
Variable Industry 1953, 1960-1972, «11976 ~—:1980 ~—+:1988 +1989
manufacturing HCI 20.7 25.2 32.0 44.4 51.9 59.6 60.9j output! Light 79.2 76.8 68.0 55.6 48.1 40.4 39.1
manufacturing HCI nao ona 636.7) 43.9 «849.2 62.0 63.5value added? Light na ona 63.3 56.1 50.8 38.0 365' manufactured HCI 19.9 7.2 24.2 33.1 456 55.5 nat exports? Light 80.0 928 75.8 66.9 54.4 44.5 na
i At currentprices. 2 At 1985 constant prices. Al current prices.| Note: HCI includes industrial chemicals, petroleum refineries, other nonmetallic mineral
products, basic metals, fabricated metal products, machinery, electrical electronic machinery and| appliances, transportation equipment and Precision equipment according to the Korean StandardIndustry Classification. Source: Economic Planning Board as quoted by Suh (1975:204) for1953 and 1960, and EPB (a) and KPTA (1989) for 1972-89,
         
Table A. 1:  Korea’s Selected Human Capital Indicators. 1940-1988.
illiteracy primary secondary terti
rate 214!
|
wre Bnr. ratioo| 214 WF Enr. ratio 214] WE Enc ratio
| 1944 86.7 11.3 53.0% n..a. 1.7 7.4* n..a. 0.2 -* n..a.| 1953 78.0 n..a. na. 59.6 N..a. nua, 16.7 n..a. 7.6 3.11960 27.9 36.0 53.0t 86.2 17.3 33.9¢ 26.6 2.5 6.1¢ 6.41970 10.6 39.9 67.4 102.8 31.7 26.4 41.3 5.5 7.3 9.31980 - na 49.1 101.0 n.a 43.0 76.0 n.a 7.8 15.81986 - na.
|
41.28 100.2 n.a. 48.64 90.0 na. [10.28] 34.2| 1990 : n.a. n.a. 108.0 n.a. n.a. 87 N.a.
J
na. 39.2
Notes: 1) Education attainmentofthe population aged 14 and over. 2) Education attainment of the work force (WF). From 1970 onwards figures for primary education includes no schooling. 3) Enrolment asapercentage of the age group. *1946 + 1963 #1983
Source: Kim, L. (1989) for 1953-1986 and UNESCOfor 1990 data on enrolments andliteracy. Data on| education attainmentfor over 14, McGinn et al (1980:111) ; and Amsden (1989:222) for the work force.     
   Table _A.3:_Korea’s Basic Macro Indicators. 1953-89 (%)Periods (a) GNP (b) Mnf. output (c) GRCF/GDP (d) GNPgrowth Growth deflator1953-59 4.6 14.7 naa. 8.9t1960.72 9.9 20.5 19.5 16.0*1973-79 10.8 17.2 26.9 20.51980-84 8.4 12.0 30.8 8.21985-89 11.5 13.8 29.4 4.31980-89 10.0 13.1 29.4 5.2Note:(a), (b) and (d) real least square averages. (c) arithmetic average.1955-60. *1961-72 Source: EPB (a) and BOK.  
 
Texto para Discusséo
   
Govemmentintervenhon and Industralization: Korea
 












    
 
  
    
 
     
 
 




Table A.& Korea's Export and Import Railo byManufacturing Sector. 193-83 (5). Table A.7: Korea's Purchase Power PallyImport ratios! 19531960 1965__1972 1974 1980 1953 Exchange Rates. 1956-88 (won/dollnr)!Total mat 10.2 121 102 15.3 Il 168 176 xeat Export” Hmpon?
T
Officia-raeHC 26.0 33.3 23.6 33.0 390 238 238 1956. 248.0 138.3 na.Light yoo 0ee 1958) 2863 163.0 AaaExport_ratiow 1960 317 232.3 166.6Total mat 1108 S319 26.5 178 3TT a 265.0 251.0 220.4na 10°06 3.5 140 273 19:0 220 habe, 273.3 259.0 229.1Light Lj 0.9 63 198 317 183 199 1966 268.0 279.7 254.9Imports divided by the total domesuc supply. 2B ages. 25;
3 esuc supply.
F






sep —fminerals, metallurgy, machinery. electrical and equipment, 1972 294.0 299.0transport equipment . chemicals. and pharmaceuticals, b) Ratios ae he” 1974 298.3 308. oteUcinthed average (output) {or the two-digit xectoral data ( Korean Induetrial 1976 269.3 asClassifications Source: SUI T.S. (1975:84) for the 1953-1974 penne 1978 aotad Bank of Korea's Input-Output Tables for the reat a : a at sgt y
f
the period 1980 257.0 65.3 250.31982 256.7 69.7 254.5198s 257.0 273.0 280.01986 na stTable AS: Korew's GDP Structure 19801000" a Bi. nea 305.7Agncaliwe Industry Manutacturing Serer ToraT Three yew moving average excena7 aay mo¢ +o aa Each exchange rate is multiphed vitaeoei960] a2 ee ie 100 Weithied everage of the mayor trade partners’ WPI TUS andi965| 396 ies 4 too Jem) tothe Korean WPI. The Japanese WPI wes aanin] jee |e AG 100 BY the index of the exchange rate of die yen'in ng te!1980] 10> aio ae to_| tubsidis and interest rate subsidies. 2 Includes otferatNetey ean pees exchange rate, wsifl and forvign exchange tax collecrunsSource: Suh C07S277 tor 1969.60 and EPR and export premia. * 1983 only . Source: Data tronKrueger (1979: 48 (f) for 1955-58, Frank et(1975: Thyfor 1958-62. Kim, K. (1991: 24) for 1962-H3: and EPH (a,IMF (by and OECD (198) for LORRS
Table 4-6: Korew's export structure by icture by main calegoricr aicommodities groupe: 196019855. millon and Enaany eReTagore Woo 1865 Total expore 318 175.0aaaete is sa 2A Taee.s T2068
semi-mant ! (86.5) (39.9) 116.3] {10.0} amanufactured 43 108.6 7
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Table _AcdiKores Havic Foreign Trade Indicators 1952.90
Yeu Exp, Imp. Trade] Curent Debt Year] Exp. Imp. Tre] Canes DebtGrowth
|
Growth Balance? Account| patio3 Growth Growth Balance? Account ratio
«| a! ussio® ox'_|| ussios wane x
19st as aa «18 1972 45.5, Os 8S SID
1953) na aa, “306 1973 75.200 484015123 31's
1984 neo 2219 1974 16.5 -36.1 2391108 32.0
1985-266 373 323 1978 4.328 -2193 9040'S
1986 033.10 BS 362 1976 ©452 15.3 1050 11 36.7
1987 -Is4 Ld 420 1977227 161764 00 33.7
1958 8-157 362 1978-174 28S 2361 21 29.7
1959 174 -19.7 284 1979 $.5 209-5283 6.7311960 648 13.0311 198017 4100-47870 BB 44.71961-246 «7.9 275, 9st 112 730-4878 7048.31962 33.9 33.3367 1982 0.8 9.0 2308 37 $2.61963 S870 331-7 1983 10.5 67 1747 2.0 $3.21964 36.5 28.0 «285, 1984 16.9 143-1387 16 $3.21965 46.7 143-288 19853.) 220-853 10 50.91966 38.2 49.7466 1986 18.0 4400 3131 45° 43.21967 280-391-676 1987324 0258 Gana 16 27.61968 38.5 43.0 -1007 1988 23.6
©
221 B86 82 1791969 317 199-1200 1989-2200 129913 24 14.561970-295) Sta. 1990 na 14-1854 nama1971240 17.0 1326
Ts i9s0. 2 Customs clearance basis. 3 Debt service divided by expors *Preimmary
Source: Krueger (1979), UN. EPH a EPB (1990) and KDI (1991)  
 
Table _A.9: Importable items Ia Kores 1961-91
 
  
year! Positive list Negative list
AA Restr. Protib. [AA Restr. [pronit’ Total AA/Toml AA- SL.
(a) Moral 4
Tet Tors |17 _|_30s : z
1962 Bi fis [433 =
1963 10a [924 aia = =
1964 496 [na |631 7 z
1965 1495 [17s 620 : =
1960 2307 127 24a0 ~
1967/Jul. 242] 2950 132 362
|
(156) | lis) (42 1312] (ilo rE)
Jul_25 : zi = Wr [402 [is [siz [eas 324
1969 : = : 73] 530 74 1312] 35.1 EVA
197 5 z mr] sis 73 a [55.0 $7.0
1973 zi zi oxy |556 [|73 t3iz{ 321 47
1975 : z a9 [602 [66 P32 aos 416
1977 : 3 ear seo [er [32 fs27 40.8
1979 E 5 683 |327 [1.097 [67.6 36.2
1981 5 ~ [5.579 1886 7,465 [75.7 60.7
1984 6.355 1,560, - [7915] 804 66.6
1985 : z 6.985 |_970 791s [_87.7 78.2
1987 5 ~ [77.307 [sos — [7.91 93.6 na
1980 = z na aa. T.gis 95.5 aToa = : na aa 791s 973 na       
 
' The data refers to the second half of the years 2 The numbers inparentheses represent the results of aFeclassification of the negative import systemto make it comparable with the positive one. However, someauthors ke Luedde-Neurath(1986:76) argue that the commodities classifications of the two syaiems Were nolcomparable, and accordingly the results of the reclassification tends tounderestimate the number of AAbetore 1967. The details of the classification of the positive lust were tot available, while the positive list





   
    
Average
   
 
    
  
Averagerate weigh
the mean, Simple avecep) oe vate of   Production in 1975.Fates only. Note: special wanffs qa
  Standant deviztion divided b
964-73) were not included,
      
system
to operztions m on export
cxemptons on equipment
Payment on en Fetes
oa rew Ca exports




GovernmentIntervention and tndustrialization: Korea
 
   
Table A.12: Estimates of Korea's Export




























lasa percentage of the official exchange rate.
2Bguals direct cash interest rates
(1958-64}+ direct tax reduction (1962-73) + interest rate
subsidy.
3 Equals net subsidy +export dollar premium (1958-61,
1963-64)+ indirect tax and tariff exemptions (1962- ).
Source: Data from Kim, S. K.(1991 :33).
 
L Table A.13: Korea's Selected Interest Rates 1963-86. (end of the period,%)
 
General Loan KDB equip- Exports Foreign toans Curb Market Retum tofixed   
Rate ment assets in Mnf.
year
|
nom. | real4 nom. | reat nom. | reat nom. | real? nom. | reat real
1963] 15.7 -3.9 na Da na na na na 152.56 32.9 33
1965] 14.0 4.1 [10.0 0.1165 -3.4] 5.5 19.8]58.8 48.9 34
1967] 24.0 17.6]10.0 3.6
|
6.0 -0.4] 5.8 -0.5 56.4 50.0 37
1969] 24.6 18.2112. 56] 60 -04] 61 3.1. $51.2 44.8 28
1971] 22.0 13.2] 12.0 3.2 6.0 -2.6
|
6.6 9.6 46.3 37.3 23
love 15.5 867120 5.1765 -04] 7.5 2.3 139.2 32.0 34
1977 15.5) -11.1f 12.0 -14.6] 8.0 -18.5§ 7.3 0.0 [41.3 15.0 29
1979 16.0 7.0 113.5 45
]
8.0 -10] 6.0 -30]738.1 29.1 33
1981 19.0 0.2
|
13.54 -5.31 9.0 -98 912.1 -6.7 42.4 23.8 na.
1983 17.0 -3.4 1165 -39 1715.0 -54]168 24.1 135.3 14.9 37*
ions 10.0 9.81100 98 17100 98
|
9.7 17.1] 25.8 25.6 na
1986 10.0 917100 9.1 [10.0 9.1784 13.4]240 23.1 na.
poof 10.0 11.5) 10.0 11.5] 10.0 11.5] 6.9 8.4
[|
24.3 25.8 fa. 
labour s
days) +   #1978. Source:1990:63) and ong 1979:171).     Ip; :Discount onbills up to one year, non-primerate? Korea Development Bank loans for equipment.>Non-bare of value-added divided by fixed assets (Hong 1979:171).4 Deflated by the WPI. 5 Libor (90Xchange rate depreciation - WPI.* 1980-82 average. Fixed assets include net working capital.Bank of Korea “ Economic Statistics Yearbook." Various years; Amsden and Eub  89
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Table A.16 Korea's Market Concentration, 1970-85.!
  
 
    
Monopoly oligopoly competitiion otal
For commode igre { ie 1985
|
1970 { 1977} 1985 £970 I 19771 19851 1970 {19777 1985
Commeniy : 39 534 774 807 1421] 276 264 «561 1492 546 2516
= i ratio %e & 30.7 21.2 51.4 52.2 56.5] 18.5 17.1 22.3] 100 100 109
ipmentratio % 8.7 12.7 9.4 151.4 61.2 528 39.8 26.1 37.8] 100 100 1¢0Monopoly = CR] >80%, $1/S82> 10.0. OligopCompetition= CR3<60% where CR; is the accumarket share of the it firm. 2 Numberof itemsof items.
>
Vatue ofitems shipped in cach type of market structure divided by the total amount shipped.




mutated market concentration of the i leading firms, and Sj is the
Produced in each type of market structure divided by the total number
Source : Lee Kyu Uck (1988) * The Current State of Econom} i i i
: :
ic Concentrat d the F; “
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Chart A.1-Trends of Foreign Direct Investment in Korea. 1962-89
 
 












  Tt T T T
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Source: Ministry of Finance as quoted in Bark (1989:3)
Table A.17: Net FDI as a Share of Gross Domestic Capital Formation (GFC) and Net
Capital Inflows (NCI) in the East Asian NICs 1966-85.
 
 
1966-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-82 1983-85
Korea
FDI (Us$ 109) 28.2 90.5 87.7 53.5 137.2
% of GRFC 1.6 1.7 0.8 0.3 0.6% of NCI 4.3 5.6 10.9 1.1 7.4
Taiwan
FDI (US$ 109 36.9 59.3 78.7 136.7 229.9
% ofGFC 2.9 1.4 1.2 1.1 2.0% ofNCI 25.g> 15.4 a a a
Singapore
FDI (US$ 10 83.1° 532.0 423.0 1186.6 1158.9% of GFC 12.7¢ 26.4 17.3 21.7 14.5% of NCI 23.4¢ 78.1 107.6 104.0 281.3
Hong-Kong
FDI (US$ 10%) p.a na 183.6 613.9 641.9% of GFC na na 4.4 6.5 8.3% ofNCI na n.a 64.1 50.0 54.5
 
 “net capital outflow. © 1966-70. 1967-72.
ideally inctude equity capital, reinvested carnings, and other capital movements. NCI = - (current account  tota) financial flows by OECD, OPEC and muttilateral agencies.Source: Happard 1990:208) except for b which was taken from Stallings 1990:62).Note: For Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, total FDI figures are taken from balance-of-payments data, whichbalance) + (unrequited transfers). For Hong-Kong,total disbursement of DFI by OECD members only; NCI =  91
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 Table A.19:  Korea's Cumulative Ownership Distribution of Foreign
 
= = Investment. 1968-83 (%)!ar inority Owned Majori Ow
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-* Free Export Zones.
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Table A.21:Share of Pollcy Loans in Total Domestic Credit. Korca
1963-86°*
year (1) All Policy (1a) Exports (1b) Earmarked (1c) Unearmarked
Loans
1963 70.3¢* 3.3 na. na.
1965 74,3%* 4.0 Na. N.a.
1967 65.0%* 7.3 fa. Na.
1969 51.0%* 9.3 na. D.a.
1971 49.9 6.1 21.2 22.5
1973 54.0 9.5 23.9 20.7
1975 $2.8 10.0 20.1 22.6
1977 55.8 10.4 19.8 25.7
1979 59.3 11.0 18.3 29.9
1981 57.0 12.2 16.4 28.4
1983 53.4 12.6 16.5 24.2
1985 49.7 12.8 17.7 21.5
1986 45.0 n.a. n.a. a.
  * Except for 1986, the annualfigures are three-year moving averages.** Denominatordoes not include Bank of Korea's loans.(1) = (1a}4{1b}4{1c) divided by total domestic credit (TDC=all loans and discounts tothe private sector by the Bank of Korea, deposit money banks, Korea DevelopmentBank and Korea Eximbank).(1a) = loans for foreign trade by deposit money banks andall loans by KoreaEximbank divided by TDC,(1b) = loans funded by government funds and the loans for agricultural industries,small and medium-sized firms, home building,etc...,divided by TDC(Ic) = loans funded by the National Investment Fund (1974), loans in foreign
currency, andall loans by the Korea Development Bank, divided by TDC.
Source: Data from Kwack and Chung (1986 :130) and Hong (1979:128) for 1963-69 
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Land from Yoo (1990:42) for the rest of the period.e
government . A 717.0 66.0 64.0
Government (%)
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